1 2 3	Andrew H. Wilson Linda M. Fong WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO 235 Montgomery Street Suite 450	
4	San Francisco, California 94104 (415) 391-3900	RECEIVED
5	Laurie J. Bartilson BOWLES & MOXON	JUN 2 0 1994
6	6255 Sunset Boulevard Suite 2000	HUB LAW OFFICES
7	Hollywood, California 90028 (213) 463-4395	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
10	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATION	AL
11	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
12	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
13	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY) CASE NO. BC 052395
14	INTERNATIONAL, A California not-for- profit religious corporation;) SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS WITH
16	Plaintiff,) REFERENCE TO SUPPORTING) EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF) MOTION OF CROSS-DEFENDANT
17	V.) CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY) INTERNATIONAL FOR SUMMARY) ADJUDICATION OF GERALD
19	v .) ARMSTRONG; DOES THE) SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF
20	GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,) ACTION OF THE AMENDED) CROSS-COMPLAINT
21	Defendant.) DATE: Aug. 3, 1994) TIME: 8:30 a.m
22) DEPT: 30
23	AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION.) Trial Date: Nov. 7, 1994) Disc. Cut-off: Oct. 7, 1994) Mtn. Cut-off: Oct. 21, 1994
25		
26	Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure S	
27	Church of Scientology International, Church of Scientology of California, Religious	
28	Technology Center, Church of Spiritual Tec	mnology, Author Services, Incorporated,

states that it "contains the entire

The Settlement Agreement

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27

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3.

3. ld. at ¶ 9.

1		
1	agreement between the parties	
2	hereto, and the terms of this	
3	Agreement are contractual and are not	
4	a mere recital."	
5		
6	4. The Settlement Agreement	4. <u>ld</u> . at ¶ 9.
7	states that it may be amended only by	
8	a written instrument executed by	
9	Armstrong and CSI.	
10		
11	5. The Settlement Agreement	5. <u>ld</u> . at ¶ 9.
12	states that Armstrong and CSI	
13	carefully read and understood the	
14	contents of the Settlement Agreement	
15	and signed it of their own free will,	
16	and it is the intention of the parties to	
17	be legally bound hereby.	
18		
19	6. Under the Settlement	
20	Agreement, Armstrong acknowledged	6. <u>Id</u> . at ¶ 11.A.
21	that he entered into the Agreement	
22	freely, voluntarily, knowingly and	
23	willingly, without any threats,	
24	intimidation or pressure of any kind	
25	whatsoever and voluntarily executed	
26	the Agreement of his own free will.	
27		
28	7. Under the Settlement	7. <u>Id</u> . at ¶ 11.B.

1	Agreement, Armstrong acknowledged	
2	that he had conducted sufficient	
3	deliberation and investigation, either	
4	personally or through other sources of	
5	his own choosing, and had obtained	
6	advice of counsel regarding the terms	
7	and conditions set forth therein, so	
8	that he may intelligently exercise his	
9	own judgment in deciding whether or	
10	not to execute the Settlement	
11	Agreement.	
12		
13	8. Under the Settlement	8. <u>Id</u> . at ¶ 11.C.
14	Agreement, Armstrong acknowledged	
15	that he had carefully read the	
16	Settlement Agreement and	
17	understood the contents of it.	
18		
19	9. Under the Settlement	9. <u>Id</u> . at ¶ 18.(A).
20	Agreement, Armstrong warranted that	
21	he had received independent legal	
22	advice from his attorneys with respect	
23	to the advisability of making the	
24	settlement provided in the Settlement	
25	Agreement and in executing it.	
26		
27	10. Armstrong knew the provisions	10. Exhibit B, Deposition of Gerald
28	of the Settlement Agreement did not	Armstrong, June 24, 1992, at
- 11		

prevent the Church from disclosing 160:19-162:3. 1 2 confidential information. 3 The Third Cause of Action of 4 11. 5 11. Cross-Complaint at ¶ 71. the Cross-Complaint for Breach of 6 Contract alleges that the Church, 7 and/or its agents, and/or other 8 Scientology-related entities, have 9 engaged in ongoing breaches of the 10 Settlement Agreement by making 11 reference to Armstrong, (a) in 12 communications to the press, (b) in 13 filing pleadings and declarations in 14 various litigations. 15 16 12. The Settlement Agreement 17 contains no provisions which prohibit 12. The Settlement Agreement, 18 Cross-Defendants from making Exhibit A. 19 reference to Armstrong in 20 communicating to the press or in 21 pleadings and declarations in various 22 litigation. 23 24 13. Armstrong received a portion of a 13. Verified Amended Complaint 25 total sum paid to his attorney, Michael (hereinafter "Complaint"), § 13; 26 Flynn, in settlement of all claims of Answer, ¶ 13; Mutual Release of All 27 Mr. Flynn's clients. Claims and Settlement Agreement, ¶ 28 3, Exhibit A.

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1	either outside the one-year statute of limitations or there is no misuse of process.	
2	CLAIM AT ISSUE: This adjudication, if granted, would dispose of the	
3	Second Cause of Action of the Amended	Cross-Complaint for Abuse of Process.
4	Undisputed Material Fact	Supporting Evidence
5	17. The conduct alleged in	17. Amended Cross-Complaint, ¶¶
6	paragraphs 13, 14, 15 through 24,	13, 14, 15 through 24, 26 and 27,
7	26, 27, 29, 30, 33 through 38, 40,	29 and 30, 33 through 38, 40, 43
8	43 through 48 and 57 of the	through 48 and 57.
9	Amended Cross-Complaint ("Cross-	
10	Complaint") is alleged to have	
11	occurred prior to July 22, 1991.	
12		
13	18. The conduct alleged in	18. Amended Cross-Complaint, ¶¶
14	paragraphs 49, 51, and 55 of the	49, 51, 55.
15	Cross-Complaint does not include	
16	conduct which invoked the process of	
17	any court.	
18		
19	19. Armstrong began working for	19. Ex. E, Declaration of Laurie J.
20	attorney Joseph Yanny as a paralegal	Bartilson, ¶ 6; Ex. F, Declaration of
21	on the case of Aznaran v. Church of	Gerald Armstrong, July 19, 1991
22	Scientology of California, et al.,	
23	United States District Court for the	
24	Central District of California, No. CV	
25	88-1786 JMI (Ex) (the " <u>Aznaran</u>	
26	case") on or about July 15, 1991.	
27		
28	20. The only declarations filed in the	20. Exhibit E, Bartilson

1	Aznaran case which mention	Declaration, ¶ 9, and Exhibits 1 - 5
2	Armstrong are:	thereto.
3	a. Declaration of Laurie J.	
4	Bartilson dated August 23, 1991.	
5	b. Declaration of Laurie J.	
6	Bartilson dated August 26, 1991.	
7	c. Declaration of Lynn R. Farny	
8	dated August 26, 1991.	
9	d. <u>Declaration of Laurie J.</u>	
10	Bartilson dated September 3, 1991.	
11	e. <u>Declaration of August</u>	
12	Murphy dated September 4, 1991.	
13		
14	21. Armstrong filed declarations in	21. Exhibit E, Declaration of Laurie J.
15	the Aznaran case on August 26, 1991	Bartilson, ¶8.
16	and September 3, 1991, which	
17	discussed his alleged experiences in	
18	the Church.	
19		
20	22. The Settlement Agreement	22. Exhibit A, Settlement Agreement,
21	provides that the Los Angeles	¶ 20.
22	Superior Court has continuing	
23	jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement	
24	Agreement in the event of a breach.	
25		
26	23. In September, 1993, the	23. Exhibit E, Declaration of Laurie J.
27	Church learned of Armstrong's filing	Bartilson, ¶¶ 2 - 8, 11.
28	of declarations in the Aznaran case.	
11		

1	1 Church counsel determined that these	
2	actions and others were violations of	
3	the Settlement Agreement.	
4	4	
5	5 24. In December, 1991, the Church 24. <u>Id.</u> , ¶12.	
6	brought a motion to enforce the	
7	7 Settlement Agreement which alleged	
8	8 that Armstrong had breached the	
9	9 Agreement, and which sought	
10	damages and a permanent injunction	
11	against Armstrong. The sole purpose	
12	of this motion was to enforce the	
13	Settlement Agreement against	
14	14 Armstrong.	
15	15	
16	25. In December, 1991, the Court 25. <u>Id</u> ., ¶13; E	xhibit G, Transcript of
17	denied the Church's motion to enforce Proceedings, pp	p. 63 - 65.
18	the Settlement Agreement on the	
19	ground that the Settlement	
20	Agreement itself was insufficient to	
21	confer continuing jurisdiction upon the	
22	22 Court.	
23	23	
24	24 26. In February, 1992, the Church 26. Verified Co	omplaint.
25	filed the Complaint herein, seeking	
26	damages and a preliminary and	
27	27 normanant injunction for Armetrana's	
11	permanent injunction for Armstrong's	

1	Agreement.	
2		
3	27. Judge Dufficy ordered this action	27. Exhibit E, Bartilson Dec., ¶15;
4	moved from Marin County to Los	Exhibit H, Order of March 5, 1992;
5	Angeles County, but only after issuing	Exhibit I, Order of March 24, 1992.
6	a temporary restraining order	
7	prohibiting Armstrong from further	
8	breaching the Settlement Agreement.	
9		
10	28. Before the file in this case was	28. Exhibit E, Bartilson Dec., ¶16-17.
11	moved to Los Angeles, but after the	
12	TRO was issued, Armstrong	
13	discussed his experiences with the	
14	Church for hours with attorneys for	
15	litigants against protected entities,	
16	and gave interviews to the press in	
17	which he also disclosed his	
18	experiences with the Church.	
19		
20	29. The TRO issued by Judge Dufficy	29. Exhibit H; Exhibit E,
21	provided that Armstrong and his	Bartilson Dec., ¶¶ 16-18.
22	agents were enjoined from violating	
23	the Settlement Agreement, including	
24	the following provisions,	
25	"2. Armstrong is restrained	
26	from violating Paragraph 7(D) which	
27	prohibits Armstrong from creating or	
28	publishing books or magazine articles,	

disclosing his experiences with Scientology, and any knowledge or information he may have concerning the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, or any of the organizations listed in paragraph 1 of the Agreement ("Scientology organizations") affiliated therewith, disclosing documents identified in Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, including films, tapes, photographs, recordings or variations or copies of any such materials which concern or relate to the religion of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard or any of the Scientology organizations;

"3. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 7(G) which prohibits
Defendant from voluntarily assisting or cooperating with any person adverse to Scientology in any proceeding against any of the Scientology organizations, or from cooperating in any manner with any organizations aligned against Scientology;

"4. Defendant is restrained

1 from violating the provisions of Paragraph 7(H) which prohibits Defendant from testifying or participating in judicial or 5 administrative proceedings adverse to 6 Scientology or any of the Scientology organizations unless compelled to do 8 so by subpoena or lawful process; 9 "5. Defendant is restrained 10 from violating the provisions of 11 Paragraph 10, which prohibits 12

Defendant from assisting or advising anyone, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, or governmental entities contemplating any claim or engaged in litigation or involved in or contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of any of the Scientology organizations..."

> As a result, the Church applied for an order to show cause re contempt, the sole purpose of which was to enforce the Settlement Agreement and the TRO.

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30. The Marin Court did not rule on

30. Exhibit J, Order of March 27,

1		
1	the merits of the Church's application	1992.
2	for an order to show cause re	
3	contempt, but simply instructed the	
4	Church to re-file it in Los Angeles.	
5		
6	31. On May 28, 1992, the Honorable	31. Exhibit K, Order of May 28,
7	Ronald Sohigian issued a preliminary	1992.
8	injunction enforcing the Settlement	
9	Agreement, finding, inter alia, that the	
10	Church had demonstrated a	
11	substantial probability of success on	
12	the merits, had been irreparably	
13	harmed by Armstrong's breaches, and	
14	that the earlier denial of the motion to	
15	enforce the settlement agreement on	
16	jurisdictional grounds did not preclude	
17	the bringing of the action.	
18		
19	32. On May 16, 1994, the Second	32. Exhibit L, Opinion and Order of
20	District Court of Appeal affirmed the	May 16, 1994, pp. 8-11.
21	order granting a preliminary injunction,	
22	which it held restrained "Armstrong's	
23	voluntary intermeddling in other	
24	litigation against [the] Church, in	
25	violation of his own agreement."	
26		
27	33. The case identified by Armstrong	33. Exhibit M, Complaint in Church of
28	in the Amended Cross-Complaint, ¶	Scientology International v. Xanthos,
11		

- 1		
1	50, is the case of Church of	et al.
2	Scientology International v. Xanthos,	
3	et al., United States District Court for	
4	the Central District of California, Case	
5	No. 91 4301 SUW (Tx) ("Xanthos").	
6		
7	34. Xanthos is a complaint against	33. Exhibit M, passim.
8	numerous IRS agents for	
9	constitutional violations. The	
10	allegation that Armstrong aided the	
11	agents in their illegal and fruitless	
12	criminal investigations is plainly a part	
13	of the constitutional violations	
14	alleged.	
15		
16	35. In August, 1991, Armstrong	34. Exhibit E, Bartilson Dec., ¶¶ 9,
17	began working for Ford Greene as a	11.
18	paralegal on the Aznaran case.	
19		
20	Dated: June 14, 1994	BOWLES & MOXON
21		VI 226
22		By: Laurie J. Bartilson
23		Andrew H. Wilson
24		Linda M. Fong WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO
25		WILDON, ITTAIN & CAMIFILLINGO
26		Attorneys for Plaintiff and
27		Cross-Defendant CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
28		COLLITICE OF THE FINA HONAL

MUTUAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

1. This Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement is made between Church of Scientology International (hereinafter "CSI") and Gerald Armstrong, (hereinafter "Plaintiff") Cross-Complainant in Gerald Armstrong v. Church of Scientology of California, Los Angeles Superior Court. Case No. 420 153. By this Agreement, Plaintiff hereby specifically waives and releases all claims he has or may have from the beginning of time to and including this date, including all causes of action of every kind and nature, known or unknown for acts and/or omissions against the officers, agents, representatives, employees, volunteers, directors, successors, assigns and legal counsel of CSI as well as the Church of Scientology of California, its officers, agents, representatives, employees, volunteers, directors, successors, assigns and legal counsel; Religious Technology Center, its officers, agents, representatives, employees, volunteers, directors, successors, assigns and legal counsel; all Scientology and Scientology affiliated organizations and entities and their officers, agents, representatives, employees, volunteers, directors, successors, assigns and legal counsel; Author Services, Inc., its officers, agents, representatives, employees, volunteers, directors, successors, assigns and legal counsel; L. Ron Hubbard, his heirs, beneficiaries, Estate and its executor; Author's Family Trust, its beneficiaries and its trustee; and Mary Sue Hubbard, (all hereinafter collectively referred to as the

"Releasees"). The parties to this Agreement hereby agree as follows:

- 2. It is understood that this settlement is a compromise of doubtful and disputed claims, and that any payment is not to be construed, and is not intended, as an admission of liability on the part of any party to this Agreement, specifically, the Releasees, by whom liability has been and continues to be expressly denied. In executing this settlement Agreement, Plaintiff acknowledges that he has released the organizations, individuals and entities listed in the above paragraph, in addition to those defendants actually named in the above lawsuit, because among other reasons, they are third party beneficiaries of this Agreement.
- 3. Plaintiff has received payment of a certain monetary sum which is a portion of a total sum of money paid to his attorney, Michael J. Flynn. The total sum paid to Mr. Flynn is to settle all of the claims of Mr. Flynn's clients.

 Plaintiff's portion of said sum has been mutually agreed upon by Plaintiff and Michael J. Flynn. Plaintiff's signature below this paragraph acknowledges that Plaintiff is completely satisfied with the monetary consideration negotiated with and received by Michael J. Flynn. Plaintiff acknowledges that there has been a block settlement between Plaintiff's attorney, Michael J. Flynn, and the Church of Scientology and Churches and entities related to the Church of Scientology, concerning all of Mr. Flynn's clients who were in litigation with any Church of Scientology or related entity. Plaintiff has received a portion of this blook.

amount, the relipt of which he hereby ach owledges.

Plaintiff understands that this amount is only a portion of the block settlement amount. The exact settlement sum received by Plaintiff is known only to Plaintiff and his attorney, Michael J. Flynn, and it is their wish that this remain so and that this amount remain confidential.

Signature line for Serald Armstrong

4. For and in consideration of the above described consideration, the mutual covenants, conditions and release contained herein, Plaintiff does hereby release, acquit and forever discharge, for himself, his heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns, the Releasees, including Church of Scientology of California, Church of Scientology International, Religious Technology Center, all Scientology and Scientology affiliated organizations and entities, Author Services, Inc. (and for each organization or entity, its officers, agents, representatives, employees, volunteers, directors, successors, assigns and legal counsel); L. Ron Hubbard, his heirs, beneficiaries, Estate and its executor; Author's Family Trust, its beneficiaries and trustee; and Mary Sue Hubbard, and each of them, of and from any and all claims, including, but not limited to, any claims or causes of action entitled Gerald Armstrong v. Church of Scientology of California, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 420 153 and all demands, damages, actions and causes of actions of every kind and nature, known or maknown,

for or becau. of any act or omission allegedly done by the Releasees, from the beginning of time to and including the date hereof. Therefore, Plaintiff does hereby authorize and direct his counsel to dismiss with prejudice his claims now pending in the above referenced action. The parties hereto will execute and cause to be filed a joint stipulation of dismissal in the form of the one attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

- A. It is expressly understood by Plaintiff that this release and all of the terms thereof do not apply to the action brought by the Church of Scientology against Plaintiff for Conversion, Fraud and other causes of action, which action has already gone to trial and is presently pending before the Second District, Third Division of the California Appellate Court (Appeal No. B005912). The disposition of those claims are controlled by the provisions of the following paragraph hereinafter.
- B. As of the date this settlement Agreement is executed, there is currently an appeal pending before the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 3, arising out of the above referenced action delineated as Appeal No. B005912. It is understood that this appeal arises out of the Church of Scientology's complaint against Plaintiff which is not settled herein. This appeal shall be maintained notwithstanding this Agreement. Plaintiff agrees to waive any rights he may have to take any further appeals from any decision eventually reached by the Court of Appeal or any rights he may have to oppose (by responding brief or any other means) any further appeals taken by the Church of

Scientology of california. The Church of Scientology of California shall have the right to file any further appeals it deems necessary.

- 5. For and in consideration of the mutual covenants, conditions and release contained herein, and Plaintiff dismissing with prejudice the action Gerald Armstrong v. Church of Scientology of California, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 420 153, the Church of Scientology of California does hereby release, acquit and forever discharge for itself, successors and assigns, Gerald Armstrong, his agents, representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, legal counsel and estate and each of them, of and from any and all claims, causes of action, demands, damages and actions of every kind and nature, known or unknown, for or because of any act or omission allegedly done by Gerald Armstrong from the beginning of time to and including the date hereof.
- 6. In executing this Agreement, the parties hereto, and each of them, agree to and do hereby waive and relinquish all rights and benefits afforded under the provisions of Section 1542 of the Civil Code of the State of California, which provides as follows:

"A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor."

- 7. Further, the undersigned hereby agree to the following:
- A. The liability for all claims is expressly denied by the parties herein released, and this final compromise and

settlement the reof shall never be treated as an admission of liability or responsibility at any time for any purpose.

- B. Plaintiff has been fully advised and understands that the alleged injuries sustained by him are of such character that the full extent and type of injuries may not be known at the date hereof, and it is further understood that said alleged injuries, whether known or unknown at the date hereof, might possibly become progressively worse and that as a result, further damages may be sustained by Plaintiff; nevertheless, Plaintiff desires by this document to forever and fully release the Releasees. Plaintiff understands that by the execution of this release no further claims arising out of his experience with, or actions by, the Releasees, from the beginning of time to and including the date hereof, which may now exist or which may exist in the future may ever be asserted by him or on his behalf, against the Releasees.
- C. Plaintiff agrees to assume responsibility for the payment of any attorney fee, lien or liens, imposed against him past, present, or future, known or unknown, by any person, firm, corporation or governmental entity or agency as a result of, or growing out of any of the matters referred to in this release. Plaintiff further agrees to hold harmless the parties herein released, and each of them, of and from any liability arising therefrom.
- D. Plaintiff agrees never to create or publish or attempt to publish, and/or assist another to create for publication by means of magazine, article, book or other

similar form, My writing or to broadcast or to assist another to create, write, film or video tape or audio tape any show, program or movie, or to grant interviews or discuss with others, concerning their experiences with the Church of Scientology, or concerning their personal or indirectly acquired knowledge or information concerning the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard or any of the organizations, individuals and entities listed in Paragraph 1 above. Plaintiff further agrees that he will maintain strict confidentiality and silence with respect to his experiences with the Church of Scientology and any knowledge or information he may have concerning the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, or any of the organizations, individuals and entities listed in Paragraph 1 above. Plaintiff expressly understands that the non-disclosure provisions of this subparagraph shall apply, inter alia, but not be limited, to the contents or substance of his complaint on file in the action referred to in Paragraph 1 hereinabove or any documents as defined in Appendix "A" to this Agreement, including but not limited to any tapes, films, photographs, recastings, variations or copies of any such materials which concern or relate to the religion of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, or any of the organizations, individuals, or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above. The attorneys for Plaintiff, subject to the ethical limitations restraining them as promulgated by the state or federal regulatory associations or agencies, agree not to disclose any of the terms and conditions of the settlement negotiations, amount of the

settlement, or statements made by either party during settlement conferences. Plaintiff agrees that if the terms of this paragraph are breached by him, that CSI and the other Releasees would be entitled to liquidated damages in the amount of \$50,000 for each such breach. All monies received to induce or in payment for a breach of this Agreement, or any part thereof, shall be held in a constructive trust pending the outcome of any litigation over said breach. The amount of liquidated damages herein is an estimate of the damages that each party would suffer in the event this Agreement is breached. The reasonableness of the amount of such damages are hereto acknowledged by Plaintiff.

E. With exception to the items specified in Paragraph 7(L), Plaintiff agrees to return to the Church of Scientology International at the time of the consummation of this Agreement, all materials in his possession, custody or control (or within the possession, custody or control of his attorney, as well as third parties who are in possession of the described documents), of any nature, including originals and all copies or summaries of documents defined in Appendix "A" to this Agreement, including but not limited to any tapes, computer disks, films, photographs, recastings, variations or copies of any such materials which concern or relate to the religion of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard or any of the organizations, individuals or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above, all evidence of any nature, including evidence obtained from the named defendants through discovery, acquired for the purposes of this lawsuit or any lawsuit, or acquired for any other purpose

concerning any Church of Scientology, any financial or administrative materials concerning any Church of Scientology, and any materials relating personally to L. Ron Hubbard, his family, or his estate. In addition to the documents and other items to be returned to the Church of Scientology International listed above and in Appendix "A", Plaintiff agrees to return the following:

- (a) All originals and copies of the manuscript for the work "Excalibur" written by L. Ron Hubbard;
- (b) All originals and copies of documents commonly known as the "Affirmations" written by L. Ron Hubbard; and
- (c) All documents and other items surrendered to the Court by Plaintiff and his attorneys pursuant to Judge Cole's orders of August 24, 1982 and September 4, 1982 and all documents and other items taken by the Plaintiff from either the Church of Scientology or Omar Garrison. This includes all documents and items entered into evidence or marked for identification in Church of Scientology of California v. Gerald Armstrong, Case No. C 420 153. Plaintiff and his attorney will execute a Joint Stipulation or such other documents as are necessary to obtain these documents from the Court. In the event any documents or other items are no longer in the custody or control of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Plaintiff and his counsel will assist the Church in recovering these documents as quickly as possible, including but not limited to those tapes and other documents now in the possession of the United States District Court in the case of <u>United States v. Zolin</u>, Case No. CV

85-0440-HLH(_), presently on appeal in _ne Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the event any of these documents are currently lodged with the Court of Appeal, Plaintiff and his attorneys will cooperate in recovering those documents as soon as the Court of Appeal issues a decision on the pending appeal.

To the extent that Plaintiff does not possess or control documents within categories A-C above, Plaintiff recognizes his continuing duty to return to CSI any and all documents that fall within categories A-C above which do in the future come into his possession or control.

- F. Plaintiff agrees that he will never again seek or obtain spiritual counselling or training or any other service from any Church of Scientology, Scientologist, Dianetics or Scientology auditor, Scientology minister, Mission of Scientology, Scientology organization or Scientology affiliated organization.
- G. Plaintiff agrees that he will not voluntarily assist or cooperate with any person adverse to Scientology in any proceeding against any of the Scientology organizations, individuals, or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above.

 Plaintiff also agrees that he will not cooperate in any manner with any organizations aligned against Scientology.
- H. Plaintiff agrees not to testify or otherwise participate in any other judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding adverse to Scientology or any of the Scientology Churches, individuals or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above unless compelled to do so by lawful subpoena or other lawful process. Plaintiff shall not make

himself amenable to service of any such suppoens in a manner which invalidates the intent of this provision. Unless required to do so by such subpoens, Plaintiff agrees not to discuss this litigation or his experiences with and knowledge of the Church with anyone other than members of his immediate family. As provided hereinafter in Paragraph 18(d), the contents of this Agreement may not be disclosed.

- I. The parties hereto agree that in the event of any future litigation between Plaintiff and any of the organizations, individuals or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above, that any past action or activity, either alleged in this lawsuit or activity similar in fact to the evidence that was developed during the course of this lawsuit, will not be used by either party against the other in any future litigation. In other words, the "slate" is wiped clean concerning past actions by any party.
- J. It is expressly understood and agreed by Plaintiff that any dispute between Plaintiff and his counsel as to the proper division of the sum paid to Plaintiff by his attorney of record is between Plaintiff and his attorney of record and shall in no way affect the validity of this Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement.
- K. Plaintiff hereby acknowledges and affirms that he is not under the influence of any drug, narcotic, alcohol or other mind-influencing substance, condition or ailment such that his ability to fully understand the meaning of this Agreement and the significance thereof is adversely affected.

- L. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 7(E) above, Plaintiff shall be entitled to retain any artwork created by him which concerns or relates to the religion of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard or any of the organizations, individuals or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above provided that such artwork never be disclosed either directly or indirectly, to anyone. In the event of a disclosure in breach of this Paragraph 7(L), Plaintiff shall be subject to the liquidated damages and constructive trust provisions of Paragraph 7(D) for each such breach.
- 8. Plaintiff further agrees that he waives and relinquishes any right or claim arising out of the conduct of any defendant in this case to date, including any of the organizations, individuals or entities as set forth in Paragraph 1 above, and the named defendants waive and relinquish any right or claim arising out of the conduct of Plaintiff to date.
- 9. This Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and the terms of this Agreement are contractual and not a mere recital. This Agreement may be amended only by a written instrument executed by Plaintiff and CSI. The parties hereto have carefully read and understand the contents of this Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement and sign the same of their own free will, and it is the intention of the parties to be legally bound hereby. No other prior or contemporaneous agreements, oral or written, respecting such matters, which are not specifically;

incorporated herein shall be deemed to in any way exist or bind any of the parties hereto.

- 10. Plaintiff agrees that he will not assist or advise anyone, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, or governmental agencies contemplating any claim or engaged in litigation or involved in or contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of any entity or class of persons listed above in Paragraph 1 of this Agreement.
- 11. The parties to this Agreement acknowledge the following:
- A. That all parties enter into this Agreement freely, voluntarily, knowingly and willingly, without any threats, intimidation or pressure of any kind whatsoever and voluntarily execute this Agreement of their own free will;
- B. That all parties have conducted sufficient deliberation and investigation, either personally or through other sources of their own choosing, and have obtained advice of counsel regarding the terms and conditions set forth herein, so that they may intelligently exercise their own judgment in deciding whether or not to execute this Agreement; and
- C. That all parties have carefully read this Agreement and understand the contents thereof and that each reference in this Agreement to any party includes successors, assigns, principals, agents and employees thereof.
- 12. Each party shall bear its respective costs with respect to the negotiation and drafting of this Agreement and

all acts required by the terms hereof to be undertaken and performed by that party.

- 13. To the extent that this Agreement inures to the benefit of persons or entities not signatories hereto, this Agreement is hereby declared to be made for their respective benefits and uses.
- 14. The parties shall execute and deliver all documents and perform all further acts that may be reasonably necessary to effectuate the provisions of this Agreement.
- 15. This Agreement shall not be construed against the party preparing it, but shall be construed as if both parties prepared this Agreement. This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
- 16. In the event any provision hereof be unenforceable, such provision shall not affect the enforceability of any other provision hereof.
- 17. All references to the plural shall include the singular and all references to the singular shall include the plural. All references to gender shall include both the masculine and feminine.
- 18.(A) Each party warrants that they have received independent legal advice from their attorneys with respect to the advisability of making the settlement provided for herein and in executing this Agreement.
- (B) The parties hereto (including any officer, agent, employee, representative or attorney of or for any party) acknowledge that they have not made any statement, at

representation or promise to the other party regarding any fact material to this Agreement except as expressly set forth herein. Furthermore, except as expressly stated in this Agreement, the parties in executing this Agreement do not rely upon any statement, representation or promise by the other party (or of any officer, agent, employee, representative or attorney for the other party).

- (C) The persons signing this Agreement have the full right and authority to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the parties for whom they are signing.
- (D) The parties hereto and their respective attorneys each agree not to disclose the contents of this executed Agreement. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent any party hereto or his respective attorney from stating that this civil action has been settled in its entirety.
- (E) The parties further agree to forbear and refrain from doing any act or exercising any right, whether existing now or in the future, which act or exercise is inconsistent with this Agreement.
- 19. Plaintiff has been fully advised by his counsel as to the contents of this document and each provision hereof. Plaintiff hereby authorizes and directs his counsel to dismiss with prejudice his claims now pending in the action entitled Gerald Armstrong v. Church of Scientology of California, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 420 153.
- 20. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the lawsuit pursuant to Paragraph 4 of this Agreement, the parties hereto agree that the Los Angeles Superior Court shall retain

jurisdiction to inforce the terms of this greement. This Agreement may be enforced by any legal or equitable remedy, including but not limited to injunctive relief or declaratory judgment where appropriate. In the event any party to this Agreement institutes any action to preserve, to protect or to enforce any right or benefit created hereunder, the prevailing party in any such action shall be entitled to the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees.

21. This Agreement may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be a duplicate original, but all of which, together, shall constitute one and the same instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement, on the date opposite their hames.

Dated: December 6, 1985

GERALD ARMSTRONG

Witness

Witness

Dated: 12/6/76

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND

CONTENT:

MICHAEL J. FLYNN

Attorney for

GERALD ARMSTRONG

Dated Scente 11, 1986

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY

INTERNATIONAL

APPENDIK A

- 1. As used herein, the term "document" or "documents" include but are not limited to all originals, file copies and copies not identical to the original, no matter how prepared, of all writings, papers, notes, records, books and other tangible things including, by way of example and not of limitation, the following:
- a. Memoranda, notes, calendars, appointment books, shorthand or stenographer's notebooks, correspondence, letters and telegrams, whether received, sent, filed or maintained internally;
- b. Drafts and notes, whether typed, penciled or otherwise, whether or not used;
 - c. Minutes, reports and summaries of meetings;
- d. Contracts, agreements, understandings, commitments, proposals and other business dealings;
- e. Recordings, transcriptions and memoranda or notes made of any telephone or face-to-face oral conversations between or among persons;
 - f. Dictated tapes or other sound recordings;
- g. Computer printouts or reports and the applicable program or programs therefor;
- h. Tapes, cards or any other means by which data are stored or preserved electrically, electronically, magnetically or mechanically, and the applicable program or program therefor (from which plaintiff may reproduce or cause to be reproduced such data in written form);

- i. Pictures, drawings, photographs, charts or other graphic representations;
- j. Checks, bills, notes, receipts, or other evidence of payment;
- k. Ledgers, journals, financial statements, accounting records, operating statements, balance sheets and statements of account.

IN AND FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a California not-for-profit religious corporation,



Plaintiff,

VS.

Case No. BC 052395

GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

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Defendants.

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REPORTED BY: SUSAN M. SKIGEN, CSR #5829

DEPOSITION OF

GERALD ARMSTRONG

Wednesday, June 24, 1992

MARY HILLABRAND INC.

STREE HOP-WC REDFEE

520 SUTTER STREET / Off UNION SQUARE SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102 PHONE 415 / 788-5350 FAX 415 / 788-0657

MARY HILLABRAND INC.

520 SUTTER STREET / 6ff UNION SQUARE SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102 PHONE 415 / 788-5350 FAX 415 / 788-0657

A. I don't think I ever have used those words and I won't now because Michael Flynn was under the same pressure that I was under. He really had been attacked, you know, and I don't fault Michael Flynn, although it sure hurt.

I really fault the organization for using Michael Flynn as a vehicle to get to me. I mean, that's just corrupt, for them to play with him at all to get to me, his client, it's corruption.

And what were they doing with him, he was going to settle his case and they were going to end the attacks on him. Whereas he gives me a contract which says on its face they can continue to attack you with impunity, Mr. Armstrong.

- Q. And --
- A. Who but a madman would sign such a document?
- Q. And at the time you got that agreement you recognized that problem with it, that it didn't prohibit them from saying whatever they wanted about you; right?
- A. Well, I also understood from basic understanding and from talking to Michael Flynn that as soon as they open their mouth and say one word, they've waived it, you have a new unit of time, they've violated

it, thee's it, you're free to talk, you can respond 1 because you cannot, this does not have to do with future 2 acts. 3 4 It does not say specifically they are free to, they will interpret it that way. And I recognize 5 6 that as soon as I hear that they've dumped documents on the L.A. Times, soon as I know that they've filed all 7 sorts of false most scurrilous statements about me in the high court in London, I know that that's going on. 9 MR. GREENE: Just a second. Let me take 10 11 about a two minute break. MR. WILSON: Sure. Go ahead. Any time you 12 13 want to. 14 (Short recess.) 15 MR. WILSON: Okay. 16 MR. GREENE: I don't think you want the 17 last answer. 18 (Pending question read by the reporter.) 19 MR. WILSON: No, I don't. 20 Let's mark this. MR. GREENE: Did we mark No. 6, just for 21 the record? > I know you asked him some questions based 22 23 on it, but I don't know if it actually got into the record as identified as being six? 24

MR. WILSON: Yes, it did.

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1	<u> </u>	MR. GREENE: Okay. Inanks.
2		MR. WILSON: Q. After how long did this
3	meeting with	Mr. Flynn and Mr. Walters take
4	approximately	7?
5	Α.	My best recollection is half an hour.
6	Q.	And was Mr. Walters there the whole time?
7	Α.	I believe so.
8	Q.	Where did it take place?
9	Α.	It was in a hotel in Westwood.
10	٥.	Okay.
11	Α.	And I don't recall the name of it.
12	٥.	Have you given us your best recollection of
13	everything th	at happened at that meeting as far as you
14	can remember	now?
15	Α.	I've given you a recollection of everything
16	in answer to	your questions. I don't know if I can come
17	up with more	just like that.
18	Q.	You testified that the liquidated damages
19	provision was	discussed; right?
20	Α.	Right.
21	Q.	And Mr. Flynn told you that that was
22	unenforceable	; right?
23	A	Right. I mean, I, I had seen that, in
0.4	fact I had s	igned documents like that inside the

organization, so I knew that they were unenforceable.

Exhibit C

DEC 1 1 1986

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIE BY BOSTE M. HURT, DEPUTE FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

GERALD ARMSTRONG,

No. C 420 153 (Severed Action)

6 Cross-Complainant,

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CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE

CALIFORNIA, a California Corporation,

Cross-Defendant.

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Upon consideration of the parties' Stipulation for . Dismissal, the "Mutual release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement" and the entire record herein, it is

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ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

17 18

That an executed duplicate original of the

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parties' "Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement"

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Court under seal.

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That this action is dismissed with prejudice.

filed herein under seal shall be retained by the Clerk of this

Dated: December // , 1986

HUB LAW OFFICES 1 Ford Greene, Esquire California State Bar No. 107601 2 711 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard 3 San Anselmo, California 94960-1949 Telephone: (415) 258-0360 4 Attorney for Defendant 5 GERALD ARMSTRONG 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN 10 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY 11 No. 152 229 INTERNATIONAL, a California 12 not-for-profit religious corporation; ARMSTRONG'S MEMORANDUM OF 13 POINTS AND AUTEORITIES IN Plaintiffs, OPPOSITION TO SCIENTOLOGY'S 14 MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY VS. INJUNCTION 15 GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 16 through 25, inclusive, Date: March 20, 1992 Time: 9:00 a.m. 17 Defendants. Dept: 4 - Specially Set 18 19 20 21 -22 23 24

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HUB LAW OFFICES
Ford Green, Engure
711 Sir Francis Drube Bivel
San Assesso, CA 94950
(415) 258-0360

someone or something was or was not adverse to, or aligned against Scientology. The agreement is not specifically enforceable because not only would it be impossible for the Court to decipher the ambiguities inherent in the agreement; even if it could rationally construe the agreement, it could never enforce it.

Additionally, since it would be impossible for the Court to enforce the agreement, it is not appropriate for the Court to issue an injunction.

e. Since There Is No Mutuality Of Remedy, Specific Performance Will Not Lie

In bilateral contract, such as the agreement herein, mutuality of obligation and remedy is necessary because of mutual promises. The doctrine requires that the promises on each side must be binding obligations in order to be consideration for each other. Mattei v. Hooper (1958) 51 Cal.2d 119, 122, 330 P.2d 625; Larwin-Southern Calif. v. JGB Inv. Co. (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 606, 637, 162 Cal.Rptr. 52. In order for the agreement to be obligatory on either party, it must be mutual and reciprocal in its obligations. Harper v. Goldschmidt () 156 Cal. 245, 104 P. 451.

Paragraphs 4A and 4B of the agreement prohibit Armstrong from litigating Scientology's complaint against him on appeal while allowing Scientology to litigate the matter in the appellate courts to the extent it desired.

Paragraph 7D prohibited Armstrong from speaking to others about Scientology, but does not prohibit Scientology from talking to others about Armstrong.

Paragraph 7E required Armstrong to deliver documents about

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711 Sir Frencis Drain Bird.
*-- Lamina, CA 94990
[415] 258-0000

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Page 50.

ADSTRUC'S RECEASED IN OFFICE IN: PREPARED INCOME.

Scientology to Scientology, but does not require Scientology to deliver to Armstrong documents it possessed concerning him.

Paragraph 7G prohibited Armstrong from assisting or cooperating with persons adverse to, or aligned against Scientology, but did not prohibit Scientology from assisting or cooperating with persons who were aligned against or adverse to Armstrong.

Paragraph 7H prohibited Armstrong from testifying about Scientology, but did not prohibit Scientology from testifying about Armstrong. 23/

There are two provisions in the agreement that are mutual.

One is that Armstrong would dismiss his Cross-Complaint in

consideration for a payment of money. The other was in Paragraph

7I which stated that neither party would say anything about the

other in future litigation. As to the former, Scientology

obtained what it paid for, and as to the latter, Scientology has

consistently breached it. Thus, as to the provisions that

Scientology seek to specifically enforce, specific performance can

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Page 51.

ADMINIST'S MECHANICE IN COPOSITION ES: PRELIGIENT INJUSTICE

Lawrence Heller, the attorney who represented to this Court that "Only Armstrong's cross-complaint was involved in the settlement, " Heller Decl. In Support of Preliminary Injunction at 1:24, **states that it was the intention of the parties that Scientology would enjoy a unilateral right to talk about Armstrong, but that he was to say nothing in response. 2:18-3:5. The reasonableness of Armstrong's rejection of Heller's claim, Exhibit 2 at ¶, is supported by Judge Breckenridge's decision, Exhibit 1-G at 1:28-3:26, and the official investigation if the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office of the so-called "police-sanctioned investigation" of Armstrong. See, Exhibit 2-M, 2-N, and 2-O. In light of the surrounding circumstances and his uncompromising stand against Scientology, it is not reasonable to conclude that Scientology could say whatever it wanted about Armstrong in its legal papers, Exhibits 2-F, 2-G, 2-H, 2-I, 2-J, and 2-K, but he was required not to respond in papers of his own.

not be had because there is an absence of mutuality.

2. To The Extent That The Agreement Is In Restraint Of Trade. It Is Invalid.

Scientology contends that enforcement of the agreement should include preventing Armstrong from working as a paralegal for Ford Greene. Cmplt. at 8:25-9:15; Memo. In Support, at 9:17-10:12. Such is an unreasonable restrain of trade.

Business and Professions Code section 16600 provides that, subject to exceptions contained in its chapter, "every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind to that extent is void." The Restatement 2d, Contracts § 186 states: "(1) A promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade. (2) A promise is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any business or restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation."

Although covenants not to compete may be enforceable if for a limited time period, such a covenant in perpetuity is not enforceable. Thus, the lifetime prohibition of Armstrong working as a paralegal is void.

3. Armstrong Has Effective Affirmative Defenses

- a. Laches

A long wait before applying for a preliminary injunction may be evidence that "the harms of which [plaintiff] complain[s] could not have been immediate and urgent." Youngblood v. Wilcox (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1376, 255 Cal.Rptr. 527.

Scientology claims that in June, 1991, Cmplt. at p. 2:28, Armstrong began his so-called campaign of "hatred and ill-will"

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SAS Assessing, CA 94950
(415) 258-0060

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Page 52.

ADSTRUCT'S PERSONNEL DE OFFICIATION DE PREDICANT DESERTE

11				
1 2	Andrew H. Wilson WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO 235 Montgomery Street			
3	Suite 450 San Francisco, California 94104 (415) 391-3900			
4 5 6	Laurie J. Bartilson BOWLES & MOXON 6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000 Hollywood, CA 90028			
7	(213) 463-4395 Attorneys for Plaintiff			
8	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL			
10	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
11	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES			
12	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY	CASE NO. BC 052395		
13	INTERNATIONAL, a California not-for-profit)			
14	religious corporation,	DECLARATION OF LAURIE J. BARTILSON IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-DEFENDANT CHURCH OF		
15	Plaintiff,	SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL'S MOTION FOR		
16 17	vs.	SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF THE SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION OF THE		
	CERALD ARMSTRONG BOES 1 through	AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT		
18	GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,	DATE: Aug. 3, 1994 TIME: 8:30 a.m.		
20	Defendants.)	DEPT: 30		
21		DISC CUT-OFF: Oct. 7, 1994 MTN CUT-OFF: Oct. 21, 1994		
22)	TRIAL DATE: Nov. 7, 1994		
23)			
24	 I am a member of the law firm of Bowles & Moxon and am an 			
25				
26	attorney admitted to practice in the State of California. My firm represents plainting			
27	and cross-defendant Church of Scientology International ("Church") in the instant			
28	case. I have personal knowledge of the matters specified in this declaration and, i			

called upon to testify on such matters, would and could do so competently.

- 2. I am also counsel of record for the Church in the case of Religious

 Technology Center et al. v. Joseph A. Yanny et al., Los Angeles Superior Court

 Case No. BC 033035 (the "Yanny case"), and counsel for the Church in the case

 of Vicki Aznaran et al. v. Church of Scientology of California et al., United States

 District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. CV 88-1786 JMI(Ex).
- Joseph Yanny represented the Church and other related entities as general counsel and in litigation matters from 1983 until 1987.
- 4. In July, 1991, Yanny substituted into the <u>Aznaran</u> case as counsel for the Aznarans against the Church and related entities. The Church asked Yanny to remove himself from the case, because of his prior employment as the Church's counsel. When Yanny refused, the Church moved for his disqualification.
- 5. While the Church's motion for disqualification was pending before the federal court, Yanny continued to act as the Aznarans' counsel, and to file memoranda, motions and other documents on their behalf. Acting on the advice of counsel, including myself, the Church initiated the Yanny action, and requested that Yanny be enjoined from his adverse representation of the Aznarans.
- 6. The Church sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against Yanny in the Yanny case. I was present during the hearings which preceded the issuance of the injunction. During those proceedings, Yanny asserted that Gerald Armstrong had been employed by him to aid him as a paralegal on the Aznaran case. Yanny also submitted to the court several declarations signed by Armstrong in which Armstrong, inter alia, described his purported experiences with the Church, disclosed portions of the Settlement Agreement, and admitted that he had voluntarily come to Los Angeles at Yanny's request for the purpose of helping Yanny with the Aznaran case.
- 7. On July 24, 1991, the federal court in the <u>Aznaran</u> case issued an order <u>sua sponte</u> withdrawing its permission for Yanny to substitute into the

<u>Aznaran</u> case on behalf of the Aznarans, and ordering Ford Greene reinstated as the Aznarans' counsel.

- 8. Declarations of Gerald Armstrong were filed in the <u>Aznaran</u> case by Greene on August 26, 1991 and September 3, 1991. In paragraph 18 of his September 3 declaration, Armstrong admitted that he had been providing Greene with paralegal assistance in the <u>Aznaran</u> case.
- 9. The Church filed declarations in the <u>Aznaran</u> case which mention or concern Armstrong as follows:
 - a. <u>Declaration of Laurie J. Bartilson</u> dated August 23, 1991.

 This declaration states that on August 19, 1991, a man who identified himself to me as Gerry Armstrong answered the telephone in Mr. Greene's office, and took a message for Mr. Greene. [¶3.] A true and correct copy of this declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
 - b. <u>Declaration of Laurie J. Bartilson</u> dated August 26, 1991. This declaration again states that on August 19, 1991, a man who identified himself to me as Gerry Armstrong answered the telephone in Mr. Greene's office, and adds that Armstrong told me that he was at Mr. Greene's office "helping out." [¶3.] It also identifies two declarations filed by Armstrong and Yanny in the <u>Yanny</u> case in which Armstrong and Yanny claimed that Armstrong was Yanny's paralegal. [¶4.] A true and correct copy of this declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
 - c. <u>Declaration of Lynn R. Farny</u> dated August 26, 1991. This declaration identifies a picture of Armstrong which was taken by a private investigator at Mr. Greene's office. [¶3.] It also quotes statements made by Armstrong in 1984 on a videotape which Mr. Farny states he has personally viewed. [¶4, 6.] A true and correct

copy of this declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

- d. <u>Declaration of Laurie J. Bartilson</u> dated September 3, 1991. This declaration again states that on August 19, 1991, a man who identified himself to me as Gerry Armstrong answered the telephone in Mr. Greene's office, and took a message for Mr. Greene [¶3]. It also states that on August 30, 1991, Armstrong called me on Mr. Greene's behalf, and asked me to provide him with additional copies of papers and exhibits. [¶4.] A true and correct copy of this declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
- e. <u>Declaration of August Murphy</u> dated September 4, 1991. This declaration states that on August 19, 1991, at 3:30 p.m., Mr. Murphy went to Greene's offices to pick up some papers. While there, he observed a man sleeping on the floor of Mr. Greene's office. [¶3.] When Mr. Murphy returned to Mr. Greene's office at 7:30, the man who had been sleeping on the floor identified himself to Mr. Murphy as Gerald Armstrong, and told Mr. Murphy to return at 9:00 p.m. [¶6.] When Mr. Murphy returned at 9:00 p.m., Armstrong announced that he was going to Kinko's to pick up the copies. He left, and returned with a large box of documents at approximately 9:35 p.m. Armstrong and Greene then assembled a set of documents and gave them to Mr. Murphy. [¶¶ 7, 8.] A true and correct copy of this declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
- 10. Each of the declarations identified in paragraph 9, <u>supra</u>, was filed in support of the Church's motion to dismiss the <u>Aznaran</u> case. The Church sought dismissal as an appropriate sanction for the deliberate hiring by the Aznarans of the Church's former lawyer. The Church argued that Armstrong's employment as a paralegal for first Yanny and then Greene gave rise to an inference of Yanny's continuing improper involvement in the <u>Aznaran</u> case. All of the declarations were

obviously and reasonably filed to provide the court with evidence in support of this theory.

- 11. Upon review of the declarations of Armstrong submitted in Yanny and in Aznaran, the statements of Yanny, my own personal contact with Armstrong acting as Greene's paralegal, as well as the Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement") signed by Armstrong in December, 1986, in the case of Church of Scientology of California v. Gerald Armstrong, LASC No. C 420 153 ("Armstrong I"), I concluded that Armstrong had plainly and obviously violated the terms of the Agreement. Specifically, Armstrong had breached paragraphs 7(D), 7(H), 7(G), 10, 12 and/or 18 of the Agreement.
- 12. On October 3, 1991, because of these clear and continuing violations of the Agreement, the Church filed a motion to enforce the Agreement in Armstrong I. The sole purpose of the filing of that motion was to obtain the relief requested; i.e., the benefits of the Agreement for which the Church had bargained and paid Armstrong approximately \$800,000.
- 13. On December 23, 1991, the <u>Armstrong I</u> court determined that it did not have continuing jurisdiction over the parties and the Agreement, and so denied the Church's motion.
- 14. Because Armstrong had breached the Agreement as described herein, and because Armstrong was continuing to breach the Agreement in, at least, his work for Mr. Greene, the Church initiated the instant action on February 4, 1992, seeking damages for breach of contract and a preliminary and permanent injunction. The sole purpose of the filing of the Complaint herein was to obtain the relief which it requests.
- 15. On March 5, 1992, Judge Dufficy issued a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") against Armstrong which prohibited Armstrong from further breaching the Agreement. On March 20, 1992, Judge Dufficy extended the duration of the TRO during the pendency of the transfer of the case to Los

Angeles.

- 16. On March 20, 1992, following the hearing in which Judge Dufficy extended the TRO, I observed Armstrong and Greene giving interviews to members of the press in the Marin County courthouse. Later I saw a broadcast on CNN in which Armstrong made statements concerning his experiences with the Church.
- 17. In late March, I read the transcript of a deposition in which Armstrong testified under oath that he had, inter alia, voluntarily discussed his experiences with the Church for several hours with attorneys for plaintiffs in a case in which a Scientology-related entity was a named defendant, and provided them with documents.
- 18. My co-counsel and I concluded that Armstrong's conduct described in paragraphs 16 and 17 were plain violations of the TRO, and brought a motion requesting the Marin Court to issue an OSC re: contempt.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 14th day of June, 1994, at Los Angeles, California.

Laurie J. Bartilson

H:\ARMSTRON\NEW-SJ-X.DEC

I, LAURIE J. BARTILSON, hereby declare and state:

- 1. I am a partner in the firm of Bowles & Moxon, which is co-counsel of record for defendants in the above-captioned case. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and, if called upon to do so, could and would competently testify thereto.
- 2. On August 19, 1991, at approximately 10:30 a.m., I called the offices of Ford Greene in San Anselmo, California. The telepone was answered by an answering machine, which played a message stating that Ford Greene had had an emergency, and would not be able to return any calls until Monday, August 19. I left a message on the machine, giving my name and telephone number, and requesting that Mr. Greene contact me concerning service of the papers which he had due to be filed that day.
- 3. At approximately 1:15 p.m. on August 19, 1991, I again called Greene's offices. This time a man answered the telephone, and offered to take a message for Ford Greene. When I asked the man for his name, he told me that he was Gerry Armstrong. I was surprised to hear this, as I knew that until recently, Mr. Armstrong had been working as a paralegal for Joseph Yanny. I explained to Mr. Armstrong that I wanted to coordinate service of the papers with Mr. Greene, and offered to have a courier pick them up from Greene's offices. Mr. Armstrong promised to relay the message.
- 4. At approximately 2:15 p.m. on August 19, 1991, Mr. Greene returned my call. I was tied up, but called him back shortly thereafter. Mr. Greene informed that the papers "were

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at Kinko's" being copied, and that he had been told that they would be ready between 5:00 and 6:00. He agreed to call my offices when they were ready for pickup.

- 5. I later discovered that my San Francisco courier had already left for San Anselmo. As the drive was substantial, he decided to simply wait at Mr. Greene's office until the papers were ready,
- 6. Mr. Greene did not give the courier copies of the papers until approximately 9:00 p.m. The courier then called my offices, and listed the materials which he had been given. The quantity of papers was substantially smaller than I had expected.
- 7. At approximately 9:45 p.m., I called Mr. Greene's offices, and once again spoke with Mr. Greene. I told him that I wanted to review with him what I the courier had gotten, as it seemed incomplete. Mr. Greene interrupted me, and said, "Let me make it easier for you. Let me tell you what you don't have. You don't have any separate statements with the summary judgment oppositions, you don't have an opposition to the motion to dismiss, you don't have an opposition to the Singer motion, and you don't have an opposition to the Rule 42 motion."
- 8. I asked Mr. Greene why it was that I had not been served with these papers. He stated that I had not been served because they were not completed and had not yet been filed. He stated that he planned to continue to work on them and to file them late. He said, "I assume that you all will object to that." I told him that I thought that we would, and expressed

the view that the Court would be likely to object as well, since the deadlines were imposed by the Court.

I declare under the penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 23rd day of August, 1991, at Los Angeles, California.

LAURIE J. MARTILSON



DECLARATION OF LAURIE J. BARTILSON

- I, LAURIE J. BARTILSON, hereby declare and state:
- 1. I am co-counsel of record for plaintiffs in the case of Aznaran v. Church of Scientology of California, et al., Case No. CV 88-1786 JMI(Ex). I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and, if called upon to do so, could and would competently testify thereto.
- 2. On August 19, 1991, I called the offices of Ford

 Greene, counsel for plaintiffs in this case, to arrange to have
 a courier pick up several oppositions which plaintiffs were due
 to file that day.
- 3. The person who answered the telephone in Mr. Greene's office identified himself as Gerald Armstrong. When queried, Armstrong stated that he was at Greene's office "helping out." I recognized that Armstrong was a person who has been a long-term litigation adversary of my client, Church of Scientology of California, having been sued for conversion of documents belonging to the Church's Founder.
- 4. In addition, in a case pending in Los Angeles Superior Court, Religious Technology Center, et al. v. Yanny, Case No. BC 033035. Armstrong and Joseph Yanny have both filed declarations under penalty of perjury that Armstrong was hired by Yanny as a paralegal to work on this case. (Ex. B, Declaration of Joseph A Yanny, July 31, 1991, para. 4; Ex. H, Declaration of Gerald Armstrong, July 19, 1991, para. 4). Even though Yanny protested its issuance, partially on the ground that Armstrong was his paralegal in this case (Ex. G, Transcript of August 6, 1991, at 25), Yanny was preliminarily

enjoined in that case from directly or indirectly acting as counsel against defendants on behalf of either the Aznarans or Gerald Armstrong.

I declare under the penalties of perjury under the laws of California and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this ___ day of August at Los Angeles, California.

LAURIE J. BARTILSON

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- I, Lynn R. Farny, do declare:
- 1. I am over 18 years of age and make this declaration of my own personal knowledge and for those matters stated upon information and belief, I believe them to be true and accurate. If called as a witness to testify as to the matters herein, I could and would do so competently.
- 2. I am corporate Secretary of the Church of Scientology International ("CSI"), a California religious corporation.
- 3. I have reviewed the photographs which are attached to the declarations of Sam Brown and Thorn Smith, Exhibits D and I to the Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. I recognize the individual in the photographs attached to the Smith declaration as John Koresko and the individual in the photographs attached to the Brown declaration as Gerald Armstrong.
- 4. I am well familiar with Gerald Armstrong, as I have worked in the legal department of CSI since 1984, and prior to that in the legal department of Church of Scientology of California ("CSC"). I have actively followed the events occurring during that time in lawsuit against Gerald Armstrong by CSC regarding his theft of private documents belonging to the Founder of the Scientology religion.
- 5. I am also well familiar with John Koresko, who was office manager and later a paralegal for Joseph A. Yanny, CSI's former attorney, during the time that Yanny represented

CSI and afterwards, when CSI and CSC sued Yanny for his breaches of fiduciary duties.

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6. That Armstrong is amenable to the kind of covert representation in which Yanny is engaging in this case is highlighted by his recorded remarks made in November 1984. At that time, Armstrong was plotting against the Scientology Churches and seeking out staff members in the Church who would be willing to assist him in overthrowing Church leadership. The Church obtained information about Armstrong's plans and, through a police-sanctioned investigation, provided Armstrong with the "defectors" he sought. On November 30, 1984, Armstrong met with one Michael Rinder, an individual whom Armstrong thought to be one of his "agents" (but who in reality was loyal to the Church). In the conversation, recorded with written permission from law enforcement, Armstrong stated the following in response to questions by Mr. Rinder as to whether they had to have actual evidence of wrongdoing to make allegations against the Church leadership:

ARMSTRONG: They can allege it. They can allege it. They don't even have -- they can allege it. RINDER: So they don't even have to -- like -- they don't have to have the document sitting in front of them and then -- ARMSTRONG: Fucking say the organization destroys the documents.

* * *

Where are the -- we don't have to prove a goddamn thing. We don't have to prove shit; we just have

to allege it.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Los Angeles, California the 26th day of August 1991.

LYNN/R. FARNY

I, LAURIE J. BARTILSON, hereby declare and state:

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I am co-counsel of record for defendants in the case of Aznaran v. Church of Scientology of California, et al., Case No. CV 88-1786 JMI(Ex). I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and, if called upon

to do so, could and would competently testify thereto.

- 2. On August 19, 1991, I called the offices of Ford Greene, counsel for plaintiffs in this case, to arrange to have a courier pick up several oppositions which plaintiffs were due to file that day.
- The person who answered the telephone in Mr. Greene's office identified himself as Gerald Armstrong. When queried, Armstrong stated that he was at Greene's office "helping out." I recognized Armstrong's voice as well, as I attended his deposition in another case. Armstrong is a long-term litigation adversary of some of the defendants, in a case which was settled in 1986.
- 4. On Friday, August 30, 1991, I received a telephone call from Gerald Armstrong. He stated that he was calling me for Ford Greene, and asked me to provide additional copies of papers and exhibits, claiming that it was difficult to tell the

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identity of persons in some of the pictures that were exhibits.

I declare under the penalties of perjury under the laws of California and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 3rd day of September, 1991, at Los Angeles, California.

LAURIE G. BARTULSON

I, AUGUST MURPHY, declare and state:

- 1. I am over the age of eighteen. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth below, and if called upon to do so, could competently testify to those facts.
- 2. On August 19, 1991, I went to the law offices of Ford Greene to pick up service copies of documents in the case of Aznaran et al. v. Church of Scientology of California et al., Case No. CV 88-1786 JMI (Ex).
- 3. I arrived at Mr. Greene's offices at approximately 3:30 p.m. I looked in the door to the office, and observed a man and a woman sleeping on the floor, underneath a single blanket.
- 4. I began looking for Mr. Greene. After a few minutes, he came around the side of the building. He explained to me that the copies were not yet ready, and would be done around 5:00 p.m. I told him that I would get a bite to eat and come back, rather than drive all the way back to the city.
- 5. When I returned to Mr. Greene's office at 5:00 p.m., the door was still locked, and the man and woman were still asleep on the floor. I knocked, and they just shrugged at me. I went outside to the front of the building, and Mr. Greene came out. He said that the papers still were not finished being copied, and that I should come back at 7:30 p.m.
- 6. When I returned at 7:30, the man who had been sleeping opened the door at my knock. He told me that Mr. Greene had gone to dinner, and that the copier had broken down. I asked

him his name, and he said that it was Gerald Armstrong. He told me to come back at 9:00 p.m.

- 7. I returned to Mr. Greene's office yet again at 9:00 p.m. Armstrong came in while I was waiting, and said that he was going to Kinko's to pick up the copies. He left, and I waited with Mr. Greene.
- 8. At approximately 9:35, Armstrong came in with a large box of documents which he took into a back room. Armstrong and Greene then put together a set of documents, which they gave to me.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at San Francisco, California, the 4th day of September, 1991.

August Murphy

Declaration of Gerald armstrong J. Gerald armstrong, declare: 1. I have been advised by attorney Joseph a yanny that he pas been sued by one or more Sweetslogy entities, hereinafter referred to so "the organization," for induring me to breach a settlement ogseement I entered into with the organization in December 1986. I am making this declaration to show that this allegation is in every respect 2. I received a telephone call from Mr. Yanny to my answering machine on or obout July 10, 1991. He left a message which singly said, cid need your help."? I

called him back at which time he reiterated his request for my help and explained that because of organization machinatrons (which have been detailed in other declarstrone by other garties), Rick and Vicki Aznaran, glaintiffs and countin - defendants , against the organization had been induced to fire their attorney, Ford Green, and that Mr. Janny had some into the case to ensure they had legal representation. Mr. Fanny also expressed during this conversation some gersonal concerne, which will remain private and conficlential

between Mr. Yanny and me. 3. I told Mr. Yanny , at that time that I would help and that & would travel to for Orgeles on July 12. It I saked him for five hundred dollars to cover my expenses, , and told him he rould consider it as gunchose of stock in the Gerald Armstrong Corporation (TGAC). I also counseled Mr. Jonny at that time regarding pis gersonal spiritual difficulties. (TGAC 11 a Colfornia Corporation in which, although it bears my name and I am its active office,

I sun so stock.), 4. I did travel to Jos Angeles, did stoy st Mr. Janny's home, did work in his office on July 15 and 16, and did write and execute a declaration on July 16 giving my knowledge of the effect of the December 1986 group settlement ogreenents on the solity of the. agranone and other incliniduals victimized by the organization to obtain proger legal regresentation. I also discussed with Mr. Janny literary and

artistic matters, also of the low, so a copyright ord trademark ottorney, in which he has expertise. The majority of my time with Mr. Young concerned spiritual matters, on area in which I have expertise. 5. I refer this Court to my declarationi of March 15, 1990 and December 25, 1990, and the exhibits thereto. These declarstroni detail the rincumstances at the time of the December 1986 set tlement and the many instances subsequently

when I was attached or threatened by the organization in violation of the settlement ogreement. these declarations make it very clear that I consider I have a right to courter the organization's attache, to speak out ogsinst its policy of fair gome and assaults on the fasie rights of individuals, and to assist those whom I would degend on for protection ogainst the organization's legal and extra-logal might and antisocial acts. It is therefore the of-

anization itself which induced me, if I was induced by ony human agency to do anything which the sgonization might consider a breach of the settlement ogreement. 6. But more than a desire to grotert myself or right the organizations unjust acts towards me, however, & helped Mr. Yanny for the simple reason that he asked. I will do the some for anyone. The organization is sware of this fast because it received my letter of

June 21, 1991, a copy of which will accompany this declaration as Exhibit 1, and acknowledged the letter's receipt in their letter of July 3, 1991, a copy of which will accompany this declarations
or Exhibit 2. It is not only the night of all men to respond to requests for help, it is our essence. If I was induced, therefore, to help Mr. Janny, or jangone lestor la lale, it was our heator Who induced me. Mr. Janny, unlike the organization, was not sware of my dedication , to helping my fellow purmons, did not know of my June

21, 1991 letter, so arted in innocence. 7. I do not ask for a supert a fee for my help, although generally & do not refuse whatever in given me. I know that I om sustained completely by the Great Coordinator Who sends to me whomever the worts me to help. I therefore connot be induced by money or whatere onyone con offer me. I declare under the pain and peralty of perguing under the lows of the State of California that the foregoing is true and

Executed their 19th Lay
of July at hew York, hew
York.

Head Alimstrony

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA						
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES						
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 56 . HON. BRUCE R. GEERNAERT, JUDGE						
4							
5	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF) CALIFORNIA,)						
6	PLAINTIFF,)						
7	VS. CASE NO. C 420 153						
8	GERALD ARMSTRONG,						
9	DEFENDANT.						
10	JAN 3 1 1992						
11	HUB LAW OFFICES						
12	•						
13	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS						
14	MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1991						
15							
16	APPPEARANCES:						
17							
18	(SEE APPEARANCE PAGE.)						
19							
20							
2.							
22							
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26							
27	COPY HERBERT CANNON, CSR NO. 1923						
28	OFFICIAL REPORTER						

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	
3		740 BROADWAY, FIFTH FLOOR NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10009
4		WLLIAM T. DRESCHER, ESQ.
5		23679 CALABASAS ROAD SUITE 388 CALABASAS, CA. 91302
6		CALABASAS, CA. 91502
7		
8	FOR THE DEFENDANT:	TOBY PLEVIN, ESQ. 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD.
9		SUITE 4-300 LOS ANGELES, CA. 90025
10		EUS ANGELES, CA. 90029
11		JOSEPH A. YANNY, ESQ. 1925 CENTURY BOULEVARD
12		SUITE 1260 LOS ANGELES, CA. 90067
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1991; 10:30 A.M.
 1
       DEPARTMENT NO. 56
                                    HON. BRUCE R. GEERNAERT, JUDGE
 3
      APPEARANCES: (SEE TITLE PAGE.)
                    (HERBERT CANNON, OFFICIAL REPORTER.)
 5
            THE COURT: THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY VERSUS ARMSTRONG.
 6
                     STATE YOUR APPEARANCES, PLEASE.
 7
            MR. HERTZBERG: MICHAEL LEE HERTZBERG, H-E-R-T-Z-B-E-R-G,
 8
      FOR THE MOVING PARTY, YOUR HONOR.
 9
            MR. DRESCHER: WILLIAM DRESCHER, D-R-E-S-C-H-E-R. ALSO
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11
      ON BEHALF OF THE MOVING PARTY, YOUR HONOR.
            MS. PLEVIN: TOBY L. PLEVIN FOR GERALD ARMSTRONG, YOUR
12
      HCNOR.
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            MR. YANNY: JOSEPH YANNY, INTERVENOR OR PROPOSED
      INTERVENOR.
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                    JUST AS A MATTER OF COURTESY, MR. HERTZBERG
16
      DROPPED THAT IN THE AISLEWAY.
17
            MR. HERTZBERG: IT WAS A PIECE OF PAPER THAT WAS THROWN
18
      AT ME.
19
                    I AM CONCENTRATING ON THIS ORAL ARGUMENT, YOUR
20
21
      HONOR. THIS IS NOT --
22
            THE COURT: DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT 15?
            MR. HERTZBERG: NO, YOUR HONOR.
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                    I DO KNOW WHEN I WENT TO READ THE CALENDAR ON
25
      THE HALLWAY A GENTLEMAN APPROACHED ME AND SAID HE HAD SOME-
26
      THING FOR ME.
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            MR. YANNY: IT IS A DEPOSITION SUBPORNA, YOUR HONOR.
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            MR. HERTZBERG: LET ME FINISH.
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OPENING UP A WHOLE NEW AREA HERE OF JUDICIAL HEARINGS WHERE THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JURY, FOR EXAMPLE, AND --

MS. PLEVIN: AS IN THIS CASE.

MR. YANNY: THE PUBLIC DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS.

THE COURT: SO BASICALLY, I AM CONCLUDING, I THINK,
THAT 664.6 DOES NOT GRANT THIS COURT JURISDICTION OVER MR.
ARMSTRONG PERSONALLY OR JURISDICTION TO, QUOTE, ENFORCE THE
AGREEMENT; NOR DOES 127(A)4 IN THAT THERE NEVER WAS AN ORDER
BY JUDGE BRECKENRIDGE REQUIRING THE PARTIES TO PERFORM THE
AGREEMENT.

MY BELIEF IS THAT HAD HE BEEN ASKED TO DO SO,
HE WOULD HAVE DECLINED EVEN ON PAIN OF HAVING THE SETTLEMENT
BLOW UP BECAUSE THAT IS JUST ANOTHER FOUR LAWSUITS WAITING.
TO HAPPEN, IN MY EXPERIENCE, WHEN YOU HAVE AN AGREEMENT
LIKE THIS.

MR. HERTZBERG: I TAKE IT YOUR HONOR IS DENYING OUR MOTION, THEN, ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION?

THE COURT: I THINK THAT IS WHAT IT COMES DOWN TO.

SO THE MINUTE ORDER WILL SHOW THAT THE MOTION IS DENIED.

MR. YANNY: THERE IS ONE OTHER MATTER, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: THIS FIRST MOTION IS DENIED ON THE BASIS
THAT JUDGE BRECKENRIDGE DID NOT SIGN AN ORDER OR MAKE AN
ORDER REQUIRING THE PARTIES TO PERFORM THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED
"MUTUAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT";
NOR DID JUDGE BRECKENRIDGE SIGN ANY ORDER RESERVING JURISDICTION INS THE COURT IN THIS CASE TO ENFORCE SAID AGREEMENT.

THE COURT IS AWARE THAT THE PARTIES STIPULATED

IN THERE, QUOTE, JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL, END QUOTE, 1 PAGE 2, LINES 5 AND 6, QUOTE, THIS COURT SHALL RETAIN 2 JURISDICTION AND MAY REOPEN THIS CASE AT ANY TIME FOR THE 3 PURPOSE OF ENFORCING SAID AGREEMENT, END QUOTE. AND, FURTHER, IT APPEARS THAT JUDGE BRECKEN-5 6 RIDGE MAY HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 7 PARTIES; BUT IT NEVERTHELESS, APPEARS THAT JUDGE BRECKEN-8 RIDGE WAS NOT ASKED TO AND DID NOT ORDER THE PARTIES TO 9 PERFORM THE AGREEMENT: NOR DID HE ORDER CONTINUING JURIS-10 DICTION AS THE PARTIES EVIDENTLY DESIRED HIM TO DO. 11 THE MOVING PARTY ASSERTS THAT THIS COURT HAS 12 JURISDICTION TO GRANT THIS MOTION PURSUANT TO CCP 127(A)4. 13 ARE YOU RELYING ON CCP 127(A)4? 14 MR. HERTZBERG: AND ALSO 664.6. 15 THE COURT: WE'LL GET TO THAT IN A MINUTE. 16 DO YOU HAVE IT THERE? MAY I SEE IT? MR. HERTZBERG: WE HAVE IT IN TWO PLACES. WE HAD IT 17 18 MISCITED, YOUR HONOR, IN ONE PAPER. 19 MS. PLEVIN: THE TEXT OF 127(A)4, YOUR HONOR, IS ON 20 PAGE 2 OF MR. ARMSTRONG'S SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO THE 21 JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE. 22 MR. HERTZBERG: I THINK WE CITED IT AS -- I BELIEVE 23 THIS IS THE CORRECT TEXT. 24 THE COURT: THAT IS WHAT THREW ME A LITTLE BIT. 25 SO YOU CITED IT AS 128(A)4; IN ANY EVENT, IT 26 PROVIDES EVERY COURT 'SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO DO ALL THE 27 FOLLOWING ... "

SO BACK IN THE MINUTE ORDER; HOWEVER, IT

2.

REALLY IS 128(A)4. SO MAKE THAT 128(A)4; HOWEVER, CCP 128(A)4 RELATES TO COMPELLING OBEDIENCE TO ITS JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND PROCESS. AND AS INDICATED, THERE IS NO SUCH JUDGMENT OR ORDER HEREIN.

DURING THE PROCEEDINGS MOVING PARTY ALSO
RELIED UPON SECTION 664.6 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT ON DECEMBER 11, 1986 THIS ACTION
WAS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. THEREFORE, THIS COURT LACKS
JURISDICTION UNDER 664.6 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SINCE THIS SECTION CEASES TO BE A JURISDICTIONAL BASIS AFTER
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL FOR THE REASONS
AND ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE NOTES OF THE OFFICIAL
COURT REPORTER.

NOW, TURNING TO THE YANNY MOTION.

MR. HERTZBERG: I JUST WANTED THE RECORD TO REFLECT THAT WE OBJECT TO THIS GROUND FOR DENYING THE MOTION, FOR DISMISSING THE MOTION, JUST FOR THE RECORD SO THE RECORD IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR.

THE COURT: ALSO ON CALENDAR THE MOTION OF JOSEPH A.

YANNY FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN THE PENDING ACTION AND FOR

ACCESS TO SEALED FILES.

I AM GOING TO CONSIDER THIS NOT AS A MOTION
TO INTERVENE AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT, BUT A MOTION
SEEKING ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS SEALED UNDER COURT ORDER.

AND THAT ELIMINATES A LOT OF THE ARGUMENT AS TO THE TECHNICALITIES OF FILING OF A COMPLAINT IN INTER-

ACTUALLY, IN YOUR PAPERS, MR. YANNY, YOU ALSO

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 56 HON. BRUCE R. GEERNAERT, JUDGE
4	
5	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF) CALIFORNIA,)
6	PLAINTIFF,)
7) CASE NO. C 420 153
8) REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE GERALD ARMSTRONG,
9	DEFENDANT.)
10	3
11	
12	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
14	
15	1, HERBERT CANNON, OFFICIAL REPORTER OF THE SUPERIOR
16	COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS
17	ANGELES, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING PAGES, 1
18	THROUGH 77, COMPRISE A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE
19	PROCEEDINGS HELD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON DECEMBER
20	23, 1991.
21	DATED THIS 6TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1992.
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25	A TIMES
26	OFFICIAL REPORTER OFFICIAL REPORTER
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Plaintiff's application for a Temporary Restraining Order was heard by the Court on this 3rd day of March, 1992, and good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

Pending the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, to be heard by the Court on March 20, 1992 a.m., Defendant Gerald Armstrong ("Armstrong" or "Defendant"), his agents and all those acting in concert are hereby temporarily enjoined from violation of that certain Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") dated December 6, 1986, including the following:

- 2. Armstrong is restrained from violating Paragraph 7(d) which prohibits Armstrong from creating or publishing books or magazine articles, disclosing his experiences with Scientology, and any knowledge or information he may have concerning the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, or any of the organizations listed in Paragraph 1 of the Agreement ("Scientology organizations") affiliated therewith, disclosing documents identified in Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, including films, tapes, photographs, recordings or variations or copies of any such materials which concern or relate to the religion of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard or any of the Scientology organizations;
- 3. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 7(g) which prohibits Defendant from voluntarily assisting or cooperating with any person adverse to Scientology in any proceeding against any of the Scientology organizations, or from cooperating in any manner with any organizations aligned against Scientology;
- 4. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 7(h) which prohibits Defendant from testifying or participating in judicial or administrative proceedings adverse to Scientology or any of the Scientology organizations unless compelled to do so by subpoena or lawful process;
- 5. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 10, which prohibits Defendant from assisting or advising anyone, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, or governmental entities contemplating any claim or

engaged in litigation or involved in or contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of any of the Scientology organizations;

- 6. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 18(d), which prohibits Defendant from disclosing the contents of the Agreement;
- 7. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to prohibit Armstrong from working in the employ of, or as an independent contractor for, Ford Greene on matters not involving the Church of Scientology International or any of the Scientology organizations.

 DATED: 3 5 , 1992.

 JUDGE OF THE SUPERICE COURT

1.

Andrew H. Wilson WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO 235 Montgomery Street Suite 450 San Francisco, California 94104 (415) 391-3900

(0)

FILED

MAR 24 1992

HOWARD HANSON MARIN COUNTY CLERK By A. Cooper, Deputy

Laurie J. Bartilson
BOWLES & MOXON
6255 Sunset Boulevard
Suite 2000
Hollywood, California 90028
(213) 661-4030

Attorneys for Plaintiff : CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a California not-for-profit religious corporation;

Plaintiff.

VB.

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GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 152229

ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY OR TRANSFER TO LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

Defendant's motion for a change of venue was heard on March 20, 1992 at 9:00 a.m. in the above-entitled Court. Plaintiff was represented by Wilson, Ryan and Campilongo, Andrew H. Wilson appearing, and by Bowles and Moxon, Laurie J. Bartilson appearing. Defendant was represented by Ford Greene.

Whereas, the Honorable Bruce R. Geernaert of the Los Angeles Superior Court, having replaced Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr., in Church of Scientology of California v. Gerald Armstrong, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. C 420 153, narrowly ruled on December 23,

SCEEL .003

- 2. This Court's order of March 5, 1992 is hereby extended through and including the earlier of May 4, 1992 for the date that a preliminary injunction is granted or denied by the hos Angeles superior court. Defendant Gerald Armstrong and his agents are hereby enjoined from violation of that certain Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") dated December 6, 1986, including the following:
- a. Armstrong is restrained from violating Paragraph 7(d) which prohibits Armstrong from creating or publishing books or magazine articles, disclosing his experiences with Scientology, and any knowledge or information he may have concerning the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, or any of the organizations listed in Paragraph 1 of the Agreement ("Scientology organizations") affiliated therewith, disclosing documents identified in Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, including films, tapes, photographs, recordings or variations or copies of any such materials which concern or relate to the religion of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard or any of the Scientology organizations;
- b. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 7(g) which prohibits Defendant from voluntarily assisting or cooperating with any person adverse to Scientology in any proceeding against any of the Scientology organizations, or from cooperating in any manner with any organizations aligned against Scientology:
- c. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 7(h) which prohibits Defendant from testifying or participating in judicial or administrative proceedings adverse to Scientology or any of the Scientology organizations unless compelled to do so by subpoena or lawful process;

sam.003

1991 that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 127(a)(4) and 664.4 he did not have jurisdiction to enforce the Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement executed December 6, 1986; and

Whereas, Paragraph 20 of said Agreement is nevertheless effective as a forum selection clause which this court may enforce under <u>Smith v. Superior Court</u> (1986); and

Having reviewed the written arguments and evidence submitted by the parties, and having heard the arguments of counsel,

It is therefore ORDERED as follows:

- 1. Defendant's motion to transfer the file in Marin County Superior Court Case No. 152229 is GRANTED.
- a. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the file herein shall be transferred to James H. Dempsey, Executive Officer and Clerk of the superior court of Los Angeles, 111 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, 90012 immediately after the expiration of twenty (20) days of the date of this Order as required by Code of Civil Procedure sections 399 and 400, the parties hereto waiving the written notice required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 400.
- b. It is FURTHER CRDERED that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 399 Plaintiff shall pay the costs of transfer of the file to Los Angeles Superior Court.
- c. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction to determine, upon noticed motion, whether Defendant should be awarded fees and costs in connection with the bringing of the Motion to Transfer and to enforce, if necessary, Paragraphs 2.b. through f. until the earlier of May 4, 1992 or the date a preliminary injunction motion is appealed or denied in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

- d. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of paragraph 10, which prohibits Defendant from assisting or advising anyone, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, or governmental entities contemplating any claim or engaged in litigation or involved in or contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of any of the Scientology organizations;
- e. Defendant is restrained from violating the provisions of Paragraph 18(d), which prohibits Defendant from disclosing the contents of the Agreement;
- f. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to prohibit Armstrong from working in the employ of, or as an independent contractor for, Ford Greens on matters not involving the Church of Scientology International or any of the Scientology organizations.

 DATED 3/2/ 1992. MICHAEL B. DUFFICY

 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Approved as to form:

Ford Greene, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Gerald Armstrong

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03-26-92 03 36PM FOOF ES

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	SUPERIC	OURT OF CAL	LIFORNIA, MAR	POUNTY 1	3: 53 VbW #45
DATE: 3/27/	92	COURT MET AT		DEPARTMENT NO	4_
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NATURE OF PROCEEDING	5: Order Re	garding Ju	rthe Hearing	ACTION	NO. 152229
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Los Angeles Injunction	County	· motion	for Prelim	inary	
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Date: May 28, 1992 Honorable Ronald M. Sobigian, Judge

M. Cervantes, Deputy Clerk None (E.R.M.)

BC 052395

(Parties and Counsel checked if pres

Church of Scientology, International

Counsel For Plaintiff

VS.

Gerald Armstrong, et al.

Counsel For Defendant

No Appearances

MATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: RULING ON MATTER TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON MAY 27, 1992

In this matter heretofore taken under submission on May 27, 1992, the court now makes the following ruling.

- 1 Plaintiff's legal remedies are inadequate insofar as the scope of relief ordered below is concerned, but not otherwise. CCP 526(4) and (5).
- The threatened acts which are restrained by the order referred to below, but only those threatened acts, would do irreparable harm to plaintiff which could not be compensated by monetary damages. CCP 526(2).
- 3 On the basis of the instant record, there is a reasonable probability that plaintiff will prevail after trial of this case in the respects restrained by this order. CCP 526(1); cf., <u>San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co.</u>, Inc. vs. Superior Court (Miller) (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 438.
- 4 Plaintiff is likely to suffer greater injury from denial of the preliminary injunction the terms of which are set out below than the injury which defendant is likely to suffer if it is granted. See Robbins vs. Superior Court (County of Sacramento) (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 199, 206.
- 5 The granting of a preliminary injunction in the terms set out below will preserve the status quo pending trial.

Date: May 28, 1992
Honorable Ronald M. Sobigian, Judge
1a

M. Cervantes, Deputy Clerk None (E.R.H.)

BC 052395

(Parties and Counsel checked if present)

Church of Scientology, International

Counsel For Plaintiff

VS.

Gerald Armstrong, et al.

Counsel For Defendant

No Appearances

MATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: RULING ON MATTER TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON MAY 27, 1992

6 Application for preliminary injunction is granted in part, in the following respects only.

Defendant Gerald Armstrong, his agents, and persons acting in concert or conspiracy with him (excluding attorneys at law who are not said defendant's agents or retained by him) are restrained and enjoined during the pendency of this suit pending further order of court from doing directly or indirectly any of the following:

Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) intending to make, intending to press, intending to arbitrate, or intending to litigate a claim against the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the "Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement" of December, 1986 regarding such claim or regarding pressing, arbitrating, or litigating it.

Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) arbitrating or litigating a claim against the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the "Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement" of December, 1986.

The court does not intend by the foregoing to prohibit defendant Armstrong from: (a) being reasonably available for the service of subpoenas on him; (b) accepting service of subpoenas on him without physical resistance, obstructive tactics, or flight; (c) testifying fully and fairly in response to properly put questions either in deposition, at trial, or in other legal or arbitration proceedings; (d) properly reporting or disclosing to authorities criminal conduct of the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the "Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement" of December, 1986; or (e) engaging in gainful employment rendering clerical or paralegal services not contrary to the terms and conditions of this order.

Date: Nay 28, 1992 Honorable Ronald M. Sohigian, Judge

M. Cervantes, Deputy Clerk None (E.R.M.)

BC 052395

(Parties and Counsel checked if present)

Church of Scientology, International

Counsel For Plaintiff

VS.

Gerald Armstrong, et al.

Counsel For Defendent

No Appearances

MATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: RULING ON MATTER TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON MAY 27, 1992

The application for preliminary injunction is otherwise denied.

- 7 The restraints referred to in sec. 6, above, will become effective upon plaintiff's posting an undertaking in the sum of \$70,000 pursuant to CCP 529(a) by 12:00 noon on June 5, 1992.
- The restraints referred to in sec. 6, above, properly balance and accommodate the policies inherent in: (a) the protectable interests of the parties to this suit; (b) the protectable interests of the public at large; (c) the goal of attaining full and impartial justice through legitimate and properly informed civil and criminal judicial proceedings and arbitrations; (d) the gravity of interest involved in what the record demonstrates defendant might communicate in derogation of the contractual language; and (e) the reasonable interpretation of the "Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement" of December, The fair interpretation of all the cases cited by the parties indicates that this is the correct decisional process. appropriately favors settlement agreements. Obviously, one limitation on freedom of contract is "public policy"; in determining what the scope of the public policy limitation on the parties' rights to enforcement of their agreement in the specific factual context of this case, the court has weighed the factors referred to in the first sentence of this section. Litigants have a substantial range of contractual freedom, even to the extent of agreeing not to assert or exercise rights which they might otherwise have. The instant record shows that plaintiff was substantially compensated as an aspect of the agreement, and does not persuasively support defendant's claim of duress or that the issues involved in this preliminary injunction proceeding were precluded by any prior decision.

Date: May 28, 1992 Honorable Ronald M. Sohigian, Judge 10

M. Cervantes, Deputy Clerk None (E.R.M.)

BC 052395

(Parties and Counsel checked if present)

Church of Scientology, International

Counsel For Plaintiff

VS.

Gerald Armstrong, et al.

Counsel For Defendant

No Appearances

MATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: RULING ON MATTER TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON MAY 27, 1992

- 9 The court does not dispositively decide the underlying merits of the case except for this preliminary determination. CCP 526(1); Baypoint Mortgage Corp. vs. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust (1985) 168 Cal. App. 3d 818, 823.
- 10 Plaintiff is ordered give written notice by mail by June 5, 1992, including in that written notice a statement regarding whether plaintiff has or has not posted the undertaking referred to in sec. 7, above, and attaching to that written notice evidence showing that the undertaking has been posted if that is the fact.

DATED: May 28, 1992.

RONALD M. SOHIGIAN

RONALD M. SOHIGIAN
Judge of the Superior Court

A copy of this minute order is sent to counsel via United States mail this date.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

CHURCH	OF SCIENTOLO	OGY I	INTERNATIONAL,)	No. B069450	
	Plaintiff	and	Respondent,)	(Super.Ct.No.	BC052395)
v)		
GERALD	ARMSTRONG,)		i
	Defendant	and	Appellant.)	1 5 - 1 1 Z	
				_)		*** *

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ronald M. Sohigian, Judge. Affirmed.

 $\label{thm:condition} \mbox{Ford Greene and Paul Morantz for Defendant and} \mbox{ Appellant.}$

Bowles & Moxon, Karen D. Holly, Wilson, Ryan & Campilongo, Andrew H. Wilson, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, Eric M. Lieberman, and Michael Lee Hertzberg for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Gerald Armstrong (Armstrong) appeals from an order granting a preliminary injunction restraining Armstrong from voluntarily giving assistance to other persons litigating or intending to litigate claims against plaintiff and respondent Church of Scientology International (Church).

The injunction was granted to enforce a settlement agreement in prior litigation between Armstrong and Church. In the settlement, Armstrong agreed he would not voluntarily assist other persons in proceedings against Church.

Armstrong does not deny violating his agreement but asserts numerous reasons why his agreement should not be enforceable. We conclude that the narrowly-limited preliminary injunction, which did not finally adjudicate the merits of Armstrong's claims, was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to make orders maintaining the status quo and preventing irreparable harm pending the ultimate resolution of the merits.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Armstrong was a member of Church between 1969 and 1981. He became an insider of high rank, familiar with Church practices and documents. He became disillusioned and left Church in 1981. When he left, he took many Church documents with him.

The Prior Action and Settlement

Church brought the prior action against Armstrong seeking return of the documents, injunctive relief against further dissemination of information contained in them, and imposition of a constructive trust. Mary Sue Hubbard, wife of Church founder L. Ron Hubbard, intervened asserting various torts against Armstrong. Armstrong filed a cross-complaint seeking damages for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract.

Church's complaint and Hubbard's complaint in intervention were tried in 1984 by Judge Breckenridge. That trial led to a judgment, eventually affirmed on appeal, holding Armstrong's conversion of the documents was justified because he believed the conversion necessary to protect himself from Church's claims that he had lied about Church matters and L. Ron Hubbard. (Church of Scientology v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1063, 1073.)

Armstrong's cross-complaint in that case was settled in December 1986 by the settlement agreement which is the subject of the injunction in the present case.

In the settlement agreement, the parties mutually released each other from all claims, except the then-pending appeal of Judge Breckenridge's decision on Church's complaint, which was expressly excluded. The settlement involved a number

of persons engaged in litigation against Church, all represented by Attorney Michael Flynn. As a result of the settlement, Armstrong was paid \$800,000. Armstrong's cross-complaint was dismissed with prejudice, as agreed, on December 11, 1986.

The portions of the settlement agreement most pertinent to this appeal are paragraphs 7-G, 7-H, and 10, in which Armstrong agreed not to voluntarily assist other persons intending to engage in litigation or other activities adverse to Church. $\frac{1}{2}$

[&]quot;G. Plaintiff agrees that he will not voluntarily assist or cooperate with any person adverse to Scientology in any proceeding against any of the Scientology organizations, individuals, or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above. Plaintiff also agrees that he will not cooperate in any manner with any organizations aligned against Scientology. [9] H. Plaintiff agrees not to testify or otherwise participate in any other judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding adverse to Scientology or any of the Scientology Churches, individuals or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above unless compelled to do so by lawful subpoena or other lawful process. Plaintiff shall not make himself amenable to service of any such subpoena in a manner which invalidates the intent of this provision. Unless required to do so by such subpoena, Plaintiff agrees not to discuss this litigation or his experiences with and knowledge of the Church with anyone other than members of his immediate family. As provided hereinafter in Paragraph 18(d), the contents of this Agreement may not be disclosed. [¶] . . . 10. Plaintiff agrees that he will not assist or advise anyone, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, or governmental agencies contemplating any claim or engaged in litigation or involved in or contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of any entity or class of persons listed above in Paragraph 1 of this Agreement."

Paragraph 20 of the agreement authorizes its enforcement by injunction.

The Present Action

In February 1992, Church filed a complaint in the present action alleging Armstrong's violation of the settlement agreement and seeking damages and injunctive relief.

In support of its motion for a preliminary injunction, Church presented evidence that since June 1991 Armstrong had violated the agreement by working as a paralegal for attorneys representing clients engaged in litigation against Church and by voluntarily and gratuitously providing evidence for such litigation. Armstrong worked as a paralegal for Attorney Joseph Yanny, who represented Richard and Vicki Aznaran in a multimillion dollar suit against Church in federal court. Armstrong also voluntarily provided declarations for use in the Aznarans' case. Armstrong thereafter worked for Attorney Ford Greene on the Aznaran and other Church related matters.

Armstrong did not deny the charged conduct but asserted the settlement agreement was not enforceable for various reasons, primarily that it was against public policy and that he signed it under duress.

The Trial Court's Preliminary Injunction

The trial court granted a limited preliminary injunction, with exceptions which addressed Armstrong's

argument that the settlement agreement violated public policy by requiring suppression of evidence in judicial proceedings.

The court found that Armstrong voluntarily entered the settlement agreement for which he received substantial compensation, and that Armstrong was unlikely to prevail on his duress claim. The court found that Armstrong could contract as part of the settlement to refrain from exercising various rights which he would otherwise have. Balancing the interim harms to the parties, the court found that to the extent of the limited acts covered by the preliminary injunction, Church would suffer irreparable harm which could not be compensated by monetary damages, and harm for which monetary damages would be difficult to calculate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subds. (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5).)

The court's order provides, in pertinent part:

"Application for preliminary injunction is granted in part, in the following respects only. [¶] Defendant Gerald Armstrong, his agents, and persons acting in concert or conspiracy with him (excluding attorneys at law who are not said defendant's agents or retained by him) are restrained and enjoined during the pendency of this suit pending further order of court from doing directly or indirectly any of the following: [¶]

Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) intending to make, intending to press, intending to arbitrate, or intending to litigate a claim against the persons

referred to in sec. 1 of the 'Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement' of December, 1986 regarding such claim or regarding pressing, arbitrating, or litigating it. [¶]

Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) arbitrating or litigating a claim against the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the 'Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement' of December, 1986."

Armstrong's public policy arguments: "The court does not intend by the foregoing to prohibit defendant Armstrong from:

(a) being reasonably available for the service of subpoenas on him; (b) accepting service of subpoenas on him without physical resistance, obstructive tactics, or flight; (c) testifying fully and fairly in response to properly put questions either in deposition, at trial, or in other legal or arbitration proceedings; (d) properly reporting or disclosing to authorities criminal conduct of the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the 'Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement' of December, 1986; or (e) engaging in gainful employment rendering clerical or paralegal services not contrary to the terms and conditions of this order."

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DISCUSSION

The grant of a preliminary injunction does not adjudicate the ultimate rights in controversy between the parties. It merely determines that the court, balancing the relative equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should be restrained from exercising the right claimed. The purpose of the injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.)

The court considers two interrelated factors. The first is the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail at trial. The second is the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied, as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the injunction is granted. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.)

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an appellate court's review on appeal from the granting of a preliminary injunction is very limited. The burden is on the appellant to make a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35—Cal.3d 63, 69; Nutro Products, Inc. v. Cole Grain Co. (1992) 3

Cal.App.4th 860, 865.) Abuse of discretion means the trial court has exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 69.)

Here, the trial court's memorandum decision reflects very careful consideration of the factors relevant to the granting of a preliminary injunction. The court weighed the relative harms to the parties and balanced the interests asserted by Armstrong. The court granted a limited preliminary injunction with exclusions protecting the countervailing interests asserted by Armstrong. We find no abuse of discretion. We cannot say that the trial court erred as a matter of law in weighing the hardships or in determining there is a reasonable probability Church would ultimately prevail to the limited extent reflected by the terms of the preliminary injunction.

Although Armstrong's "freedom of speech" is affected, it is clear that a party may voluntarily by contract agree to limit his freedom of speech. (See <u>In re Steinberg</u> (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 14, 18-20 [filmmaker agreed to prior restraint on distribution of film]; <u>ITT Telecom Products Corp.</u> v. <u>Dooley</u> (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 319 [employee's agreement not to disclose confidential information; "it is possible to waive even First Amendment free speech rights by contract"]; <u>Snepp</u> v. <u>United States</u> (1980) 444 U.S. 507, 509, fn. 3 [book by CIA

employee subject to prepublication clearance by terms of his
employment contract].)

The exceptions in the trial court's injunction assured that the injunction would not serve to suppress evidence in legal proceedings. The injunction expressly did not restrain Armstrong from accepting service of subpenas, testifying fully and fairly in legal proceedings, and reporting criminal conduct to the authorities. (See Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1081-1082.) This contrasts with the stipulation in Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 308, 315-316, cited by Armstrong, which prevented a party from disclosing misconduct to regulatory authorities.

This appeal is only from the granting of a preliminary injunction which expressly did not decide the ultimate merits. As limited by the trial court here, the preliminary injunction merely restrains, for the time being, Armstrong's voluntary intermeddling in other litigation against Church, in violation of his own agreement. We decline any extended discussion of Armstrong's shotgun-style brief, which offers more than a dozen separate contentions against enforcement. It suffices to say that Armstrong has not borne his burden on appeal to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order granting a preliminary injunction is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

VOGEL (C.S.), Acting P.J.

We concur:

HASTINGS, J.

KLEIN (Brett), J.*

^{*}Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT JOSEPH A. LANE, CLERK

DIVISION: 4 DATE: 05/16/94

Bowles & Moxon
Laurie J. Bartilson
6255 Sunset Blvd
Suite 2000
Hollywood, CA. 90028

RE: Church of Scientology International vs.
Armstrong, Gerald
2 Civil B069450
Los Angeles NO. BC052395

John J. Quinn Eric L. Dobberteen QUINN, KULLY AND MORROW 520 South Grand Avenue, 8th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 622-0300 FILED CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 4 William T. Drescher 23679 Calabasas Road, Suite 338 AUG | 2 1991 Calabasas, CA 91302 (818) 591-0039 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Earle C. Cooley COOLEY, MANION, MOORE & JONES, P.C. 21 Custom House Street Boston, MA 02110 (617) 542-3700 9 Kendrick L. Moxon James H. Berry, Jr. 10 BOWLES & MOXON BERRY & CAHALAN 6255 Sunset Boulevard, 2049 Century Park East 11 Suite 2000 Suite 2750 Hollywood, CA 90028 Los Angeles, CA 90067 12 (213) 284-2183 (213) 661-4030 13 Attorneys for Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, 18 Plaintiff, No. 19 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR AND VS. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM: 20 C. PHILLIP XANTHOS; ALAN 1. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS; LIPKIN; MARCUS OWENS; MARVIN) 21 FRIEDLANDER; S. ALLEN 2. FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS; WINBORNE; ROBERT BRAUER; 3. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS UNDER JOSEPH TEDESCO; CHARLES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT; AND RUMPH; RAYMOND JUCKSCH; 4. EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS 23 MELVYN YOUNG; CARL CORSI; UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT GREGORY ROTH; WILLIAM 24 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED CONNETT: KEITH ALAN KUHN; CHARLES JEGLIKOWSKI; MELVIN BLOUGH; RODERICK DARLING; and DOES 1 - 200, 26 Defendants. 27

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JURISDICTION AND VENUS

- 1. As this action seeks damages for violations of the United States Constitution brought under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
- 2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship and the claims arose in this judicial district. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) in that this is a civil action in which all the defendants are or were employees of a United States agancy, some of whom are residents of this judicial district, which is the judicial district in which plaintiff resides and in which the causes of action set forth arose.

<u>PARTIES</u>

3. Plaintiff Church of Scientology International ("the Church") is a not for profit religious corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. In accordance with the ecclesiastical policies of the Scientology religion, plaintiff is the Mother Church of the Scientology religion, an internationally recognized religion engaged solely in spiritual, charitable, humanitarian and community-oriented endeavors intended to enhance adherents' spiritual knowledge of themselves and their Creator. The Scientology religion has more than 8 million members and Scientology Churches, Missions and groups exist in 90 nations around the world.

- 4. Except for three who have retired from government service since performing the acts hereinafter averred, the defendants are, and at all relevant times were, employees of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). The matters averred in this Complaint are largely drawn from information only recently discovered by the Church in the course of Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") litigation.
- 5. As the conduct which gives rise to the Church's claims of constitutional violations occurred within different divisions and offices of the IRS, the defendants are grouped within their respective divisions for the purposes of the following identifying averments:

A. Los Angeles Criminal Investigation Division.

- i. Defendant Philip Xanthos ("Xanthos") is, and at all relevant times was, a Branch Chief of the Los Angeles Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS ("LA CID"). Upon information and belief, Xanthos resides in this judicial district.
- ii. Defendant Alan Lipkin ("Lipkin") is, and at all relevant times was, a Group Manager within LA CID. Upon information and belief, Lipkin resides in this judicial district.

B. National Office Exempt Organizations.

i. Defendant Marcus Owens ("Owens") is currently the Director of the IRS National Office Exempt Organizations ("EO") Technical Division, and was, at all relevant times an official of the EO Technical Division. Upon

information and belief, Owens resides in the State of Maryland.

- ii. Defendant Marvin Friedlander

 ("Friedlander") is, and at all relevant times was,
 an IRS Senior Conferee Reviewer in the EO

 Technical Division. Upon information and belief,
 Friedlander resides in the State of Maryland.
- iii. Defendant S. Allen Winborne ("Winborne")
 was at all relevant times until approximately
 1987 IRS Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans
 and Exempt Organizations. Upon information and belief,
 Winborne resides in the State of Maryland.
- iv. Defendant Robert Brauer ("Brauer") was
 at all relevant times from approximately

 1987 to and including approximately December, 1990, IRS

 Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt

 Organizations. Since in or about January, 1991,

 Brauer has been the IRS District Director in

 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Upon information and

 belief, Brauer resides in the Commonwealth of

 Pennsylvania.
- v. Defendant Joseph Tedesco ("Tedesco") was at all relevant times until approximately 1987, Chief of the National Office Exempt Organizations
 Technical Division. Since in or about 1987,
 Tedesco has been in retirement. Upon information and belief, Tedesco resides in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

vi. Defendant Charles Rumph ("Rumph") was at all relevant times until approximately 1986, an attorney in the Tax Litigation Division, Office of Chief Counsel at the National Office. Although he did not work in EO, plaintiff is informed and believes that Rumph worked in conjunction with the other EO defendants in doing the acts hereinafter averred. Since in or about 1986, Rumph has been in retirement. Upon information and belief, Rumph resides in the District of Columbia.

vii. Defendant Roderick Darling ("Darling")
is, and at all relevant times was, an IRS tax law
specialist in the EO Technical Division. Upon
information and belief, Darling resides in the
State of Maryland.

C. Los Angeles Exempt Organizations Division.

- i. Defendant Raymond Jucksch ("Jucksch") is, and at all relevant times was, a Group Manager within the Los Angeles Exempt Organizations
 Division of the IRS ("LA EO"). Upon information and belief, Jucksch resides in this judicial district.
- ii. Defendant Melvyn Young ("Young") is, and at all relevant times was, a Revenue Agent within LA EO. Upon information and belief, Young resides in this judicial district.
- iii. Defendant Carl Corsi ("Corsi") was at all relevant times to and including

July, 1989, a Revenue Agent within LA EO.

Since in or about July, 1989, Corsi has been in retirement. Upon information and belief, Corsi resides in this judicial district.

D. Los Angeles District Counsel Office.

- i. Defendant Charles Jeglikowski

 ("Jeglikowski") is, and at all relevant times was,
 an attorney within the IRS District Counsel's

 office located in Thousand Oaks, California. Upon
 information and belief, Jeglikowski resides in
 this judicial district.
- ii. Defendant Gregory Roth ("Roth") is, and at all relevant times was, an attorney within the IRS District Counsel's office located in Thousand Oaks, California. Upon information and belief, Roth resides in this judicial district.

E. Los Angeles District Office.

- i. Defendant William Connett ("Connett")
 was at all relevant times to and including
 January, 1986, District Director of the Los
 Angeles District Office of the IRS. Since in or
 about 1987, Connett has been the IRS
 Representative in Paris, France, where, on
 information and belief, he now resides.

 F. IRS National Office Internal Security
 Division.
- i. Defendant Keith Alan Kuhn ("Kuhn") is, and at all relevant times was, Chief of the

Investigations Branch of the Internal Security
Division of the Office of the Chief Inspector of
the IRS. Upon information and belief, Kuhn
resides either in the State of Maryland or the
Commonwealth of Virginia.

- G. St. Petersburg. Florida Exempt Organizations
 Division.
- i. Defendant Melvin Blough ("Blough") is, and at all relevant times was, a Revenue Agent within the Exempt Organizations Division of the St.

 Petersburg, Florida office of the IRS. Upon information and belief, Blough resides in the state of Florida.
- 6. Upon information and belief, IRS employees other than those named as defendants in this action performed acts which are unlawful and unconstitutional in connection with the facts set forth in this complaint. The Church will seek leave of Court to amend this complaint when the IRS employees not named as defendants, but whose conduct warrants their inclusion as defendants in this action, are identified.

NATURE OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

7. By this action, the Church seeks damages for violations of its First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights arising from the conduct of the defendants and others within the Internal Revenue Service. While this action focuses on recent events, it is the culmination of three decades of IRS coercion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, discriminatory treatment in violation of the

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 (For First and Fifth Amendment Violations by All Defendants)

- 38. The Church repeats and realleges each and every averment set forth in paragraphs 1 through 35, inclusive.
- 39. On or about December 4, 1987, defendant Friedlander informed Church representatives that the IRS insisted upon a "limited" review of the financial records of plaintiff RTC, and CST for 1986, to be conducted by the Los Angeles District Office, for the purpose of verifying the integrity of their records and to rule out the existence of any private inurement, the only remaining potentially disqualifying factor. In early 1988, defendants Friedlander and Brauer assured plaintiff of favorable exemption determinations as long as the limited review did not uncover inurement or an inadequate accounting system.
- 40. Those representations were false. Documents released by the IRS in later FOIA litigation included drafts of final denial letters for plaintiff, RTC and CST written by Friedlander and Darling in January of 1988, at the very time when defendants Brauer and Friedlander were representing to Church counsel that exemption was imminent. In fact, the representations were no more than a ploy to entice plaintiff and the other Scientology Churches to continue turning over detailed information to the IRS in violation of the Church's civil and constitutional rights.
- 41. On March 17, 1988, the National Office provided plaintiff, RTC and CST with new letters of assurance stating that the IRS was prepared to conduct a review so that "we may

complete favorable consideration" of the exemption applications. The letters further stated that the purpose of the review was to "determine the integrity of your financial and accounting systems" and "verify that no part of your net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual and that there is no other disqualifying activity." Each Church executed its letter of assurance, permitting the extremely unusual process of an on-site document review of plaintiff's records to proceed.

- 42. Extensive, on-site reviews began, starting with CST, in March of 1988. Despite the initial statement by Friedlander that the review would be limited, the Los Angeles office initially assigned four full-time agents to the review, and after eight weeks, another four full-time agents were added. This staffing represented 48 personnel weeks or roughly one year of IRS time. Friedlander and his superior, defendant Owens, testified that these examinations were the "most sweeping" examinations these officials had witnessed, "far exceeding" any they had previously experienced, and that the volume of information provided was "truly record-breaking."
- 43. The examination of CST was completed on June 2, 1988. At that time, the IRS Branch Chief responsible for the review stated that the agents had found nothing to show inurement and affirmed that, as to CST, "we have no concerns at this time."

 These statements confirm the findings of a memorandum written by defendant Friedlander in November 1987 which stated that private benefit ceased to be an issue following the death of L. Ron Hubbard in January 1986. Following the completion of the

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27 28 examination to CST, the IRS Los Angeles office began its review of RTC, which was completed in June 1988 -- again with no concerns raised by the agents.

- 44. On June 22, 1988, the Church discovered that in May 1988, defendants Corsi, Young and Roth secretly interviewed two disaffected Scientologists, Richard and Vicki Asnaran, who were suing CSI and other Scientology churches. Prior to leaving the Scientology faith in 1987, Vicki Aznaran had served as one of RTC's officers. These defendants had engaged in deceitful conduct designed to prevent the Churches from discovering that the IRS investigation was actually proceeding on two tracks: one known to the Churches, which was based ostensibly on good faith cooperation between the churches and the IRS, and the other which was covert and designed to undermine the progress the Churches believed had been made towards the granting of exempt status. The discovery of this conduct raised serious concerns about whether the IRS was proceeding in good faith and in accordance with the March 17, 1988 agreement. The Churches immediately sought a meeting with the IRS to discuss their concerns.
- 45. It was later revealed that defendant Lipkin of the CID was instrumental in arranging the interview of the Aznarans by the EO agents, thus demonstrating the continuing ties between EO and CID. Plaintiff, RTC and CST were also not aware at the time that the two senior LA EO agents in the examination, defendants Young and Corsi, had met several times with LA CID during the review, that defendant Lipkin had briefed all of the agents involved in conducting the review,

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and that defendants Corsi and Young had by this time received and reviewed the Special Agent's Report. Thus, CID collusion with LA EO did not end in 1985 when IRS District Counsel rejected CID's request for prosecution, nor in 1986 when the Justice Department refused to convene a grand jury.

- During their interview of the Aznarans, defendants Corsi, Young and Roth openly displayed their animus toward the Church and the Scientology religion. The agents referred to Church religious services as a "dog and pony show", and referred to members of the Church as "crasy devotees". Defendant Young actually encouraged the Asnarans to "take a stand" against the Church. Defendant Roth compared the Scientology religion to drug addiction. These actions violate Internal Revenue Service policies which require an employee to maintain "strict impartiality" between the taxpayer and the government. These agents, who openly denigrated the Scientology religion, should have been removed from any examinations of Scientology churches under The Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook of the Rules of Conduct which indicates that an agent should be removed if his actions could lead others reasonably to question the employee's impartiality. 0735.1, Handbook of Employee Responsibilities and Conduct § 232.21, MT 0735.1-17 (November 26, 1986).
- 47. On June 22, 1988, plaintiff contacted IRS representatives from the Los Angeles office and asked why the the summonses had been issued to the Aznarans. The IRS refused to discuss the interview or confirm that it had taken place. Church counsel informed the IRS that the document review was

accordingly being suspended until the matter was resolved with the National Office. On June 24, 1988, in response to a letter from the Church regarding its concerns that the document review was apparently being conducted in bad faith, defendant Friedlander admitted that the IRS "owed [the churches] an explanation."

- 48. In January of 1988, prior to the start of the on site review, final adverse determinations were already drafted and circulated by Friedlander and Darling. After June 27, 1988, while the Churches were awaiting defendant Friedlander's promised explanation, the IRS finalized the adverse determination letters from the pre-existing drafts without substantive amendment. On July 7, 1988, the IRS informed CST that in its view the IRS had proceeded in accordance with the March 17 agreement and that it viewed the suspension of the audit as a termination of that agreement.
- 49. The following day, July 8, 1988, plaintiff and the other Churches wrote the IRS reiterating that they had not terminated the examination, but were waiting for the promised explanation regarding the Aznaran interview. The letters stated that the Churches did wish to fulfill the terms of the March 17, 1988 agreement, and that all they sought was a meeting with the IRS to clarify matters before the examination procedure resumed. That same day the IRS issued final adverse ruling letters to all three churches denying tax-exempt status. These letters were nearly identical to those drafted six months earlier by Friedlander and Darling. Despite previous assurances to the contrary, the denials of the applications of

plaintiff and RTC were based, in part, on alleged commercialism in the sale of religious goods and services.

- 50. The IRS on-site review procedure was an utter sham, designed not to make any good faith determination of the tax exempt status of plaintiff, but merely to continue to collect information which would not otherwise have been provided to the IRS. The on-site reviews also included examination of myriad ecclesiastical and confidential Church scriptural materials and other materials concerning the religious practices of the Churches which had no reasonable relation to any tax exemption issue.
- 51. The defendants, and each of them, by their conduct alleged herein, have singled out plaintiff because of its in position as Mother Church of the Scientology religion and, through those acts, have invidiously discriminated against plaintiff in their application of the laws of the United States, in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
- 52. The defendants, and each of them, by their conduct alleged herein, have singled out plaintiff for invidious discrimination in the application of the laws of the United States on the basis of plaintiff's religious affiliation, in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
- 53. The conduct of the defendants, and each of them, has been arbitrary and capricious, and has resulted in the deprivation of plaintiff's property. Such conduct, metivated by religiously rooted bias and prejudice, is a violation of the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. «

54. Plaintiff has been damaged and continues to be damaged thereby in an amount to be proven at trial. That amount is not presently capable of precise calculation but is believed to be in excess of \$20,792,850 which represents direct expenditures by plaintiff. Plaintiff has also suffered consequential and resulting damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but which is in an amount in excess of \$100 million.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(For First and Fifth Amendment Violations by All Defendants)

- 55. The Church repeats and realleges each and every averment set forth in paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive.
- 56. The IRS began additional harassive actions against plaintiff and Scientology parishioners commencing in October, 1988, when the IRS issued letters to several Scientologist taxpayers, who had claimed deductions on their tax returns for money paid to their Scientology churches for religious services, informing them that their cases were part of a "designated tax shelter litigation project entitled Scientology." Such a designation was blatantly improper and demonstrated discriminatory bias and creation of a suspect category of members of the Scientology religion.
- 57. Similarly, on February 14, 1989, the IRS office in Laguna Niguel, California sent a letter to two Scientologists concerning Church-related deductions, stating that no deduction would be allowed as they had not shown that Scientology is "other than a sham designed for the purpose of claiming

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blatantly false and the result of bias, since even the IRS has repeatedly acknowledged that Scientology is a bona fide religion and that Scientology churches are bona fide churches. The IRS was forced to correct their files to delete these references after the Scientologists who received this letter prevailed in <u>Smith v. Brady</u>, No. CV 89-2584-RG(Bx) (C.D. Cal. 1990). Indeed, the IRS acknowledged that such designations were improper in a national office memorandum issued in 1986, yet the IRS continued labelling Scientologists as tax protestors as late as 1989.

Documents obtained in FOIA litigation reveal an : entire set of procedures set up for the purpose of targetting the tax returns of individual Scientologists, monitoring and coordinating the investigations of these individuals, and falsely designating them as "tax protestors." These documents, from the Los Angeles District, show that the returns of Scientologists who claim deductions for their contributions to the Church are designated with a special code for "Alleged Contributions (incl. Scientology & Alleged Church) . This code is part of the Tax Protestor Program described in the Internal Revenue Manual, and allows the returns, which are treated as "priority cases," to be "controlled" through the IRS' nationwide computer system. A special questionnaire for Scientology cases is included for use by IRS examiners. internal memo, designed to assist IRS examiners in handling these cases, lists several organizations which have never even existed, and claims that these are names used by the "Church of

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scientology."

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Defendant Melvin Blough attempted to utilize the church audit procedures of 26 U.S.C. § 7611 to identify thousands of parishioners of the Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization ("CSFSO") for the purpose of selecting their personal tax returns for audit. Blough testified that he wished to obtain records from CSFSO which would: (a) identify all of its parishioners for a three year period; (b) identify each of the courses delivered by CSFSO and describe them; (c) identify the courses taken by the parishioners; and (d) pull the tax returns of a number of these individuals. Blough stated that CSFSO provides courses to an estimated 8,000 parishiosers a year, and further claimed that the IRS would use as many agents as needed to compile this information. In fact, nearly 100 parishioners of CSFSO have received audit notices regarding their contributions to the Church since Blough announced his Blough also utilized the Cult Awareness Network ("CAN") as a means to improperly gather information regarding the Church. CAN is a modern day hate group, whose tactics include kidnapping, brainwashing and beating of individuals found to be quilty of holding "unacceptable" religious convictions. Despite these activities, CAN was granted tax exempt status by the IRS, and was used by Blough as an information gathering arm, for the purpose of procuring information on individual Scientologists and their businesses.

of actions by IRS personnel have not been limited to the borders of the United States. William Connett is now stationed

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as the IRS' foreign representative in France where he has a wide range of influence in European countries. Since his posting there have been raids on churches of Scientology by police and taxing authorities and unwarranted arrests of individual Scientologists in France, Italy and Spain. When two staff members of the Church of Scientology in Brussells were initially denied visas to travel to the United States, this was traced directly back to false information provided to the consulate officials by Connett.

In an effort to harass, discredit and smear plaintiff, to intimidate IRS employees who might otherwise treat plaintiff fairly or disclose IRS misconduct, and to evade FOIA disclosure obligations, defendant Reith Alan Rulin has begun to proliferate unsubstantiated and patently false allegations against Scientology and Scientologists, which have been used as a pretext to manufacture security risks to IRS In or about May 1990, Kuhn sent out a memorandum to each of the Regional Inspectors around the country, directing them to contact specifically named EO employees who were working on Scientology cases. Based on scurillous and unsubstantiated charges, Kuhn directed that these EO employees be told that there was a potential for harassment against them from the Church, thus creating a climate where plaintiff and other Scientology churches could not possibly receive unbiased treatment from any EO agent throughout the country. Kuhn's allegations themselves are entirely without merit. filed a declaration by Kuhn which contained these charges in a FOIA case brought by a Scientology Church. The District Court

judge in that case ordered the declaration stricken from the record, describing it as "scurrilous" and "unfounded".

- 62. After the collapse of the criminal investigation and after denying section 501(c)(3) exemption to plaintiff, RTC and CST, the nationwide examination of exempt and nonexempt Scientology Churches and entities which had been planned early in 1986 was resuscitated by defendants and the IRS. A three-day meeting on Scientology was convened at the IRS National Office on October 19, 20 and 21, 1988 to coordinate nationwide actions against various Scientology Churches, including plaintiff.
- 63. That three-day meeting was ordered by defendant Brauer, organized and convened by defendant Owens, and chaired by defendant Friedlander. Also in attendance were:
 - a. EO Operations employee Tom Miller, who had drafted the 1986 proposal to re-examine the exempt Scientology Churches;
 - b. Roderick Darling;
 - c. LA EO Branch Chief Mel Joseph, along with defendants Young and Corsi;
 - d. Defendant Blough;
 - e. IRS agents from at least the Brooklyn, Baltimore, and Los Angeles Regional offices; and
 - f. IRS National Office representatives.
- 64. Various strategic plans for a continued IRS campaign directed at Scientology were discussed at the three-day meeting in October 1988. Defendant Young prepared and delivered a

briefing at Lost conference in which he proposed that and explained how the IRS could use the assessment of tax liabilities under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act ("FICA") and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") to exploit the non-exempt status of various Scientology Churches, completely disregarding the fact that the Churches in question, including plaintiff, had filed waivers seeking exemption from those employment taxes which had been accepted by the IRS.

- a nationwide campaign of examinations of exempt and non-exempt Scientology Churches was distributed and discussed, and the decision was made during that meeting to commence tax inquiries of plaintiff, Church of Scientology Western United States ("CSWUS"), Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization ("CSFSO"), Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. ("FCDC") and Church of Scientology of Boston ("Boston Church"). Those inquiries in fact did commence, upon the issuance of notices of tax inquiry to those Churches which were circulated during that three-day meeting.
- 66. Upon receipt of the virtually identical notices of tax inquiry, plaintiff, CSWUS, CSFSO, FCDC, and the Boston Church responded by pointing out inaccuracies and deficiencies in the standardized, coordinated notices and, despite those infirmities, responded to the questions posed by those notices. In each instance, however, the IRS issued a notice of church examination under the Church Audit Procedures Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7611. In four of those, summonses were issued and summons enforcement proceedings commenced in the appropriate district

court. In the CSFSO case, the matter is still pending in the United States pistrict Court for Middle District of Florida; this Court, the Honorable Harry L. Hupp, presiding, quashed the majority of both the summonses issued to CSWUS and plaintiff; the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts quashed the summons to the Boston Church outright. The FCDC examination was conducted, and despite nearly two years of intrusive inquiry, the IRS declined to cancel FCDC's exemption.

- churches were coupled with concurrently timed IRS activities directed against other Scientology Churches and individual. Scientologists. These various coordinated activities against Scientology are the responsibility of what defendant Owens has described as "thousands of [IRS] employees in key districts and district offices around the country and the National Office." Those coordinated actions have also been the subject of later meetings on Scientology at the IRS National Office, involving as many as 40 attendees from different IRS regions and divisions, in pursuit of what the SAR termed the "final halt to" and "ultimate disintegration of" Scientology.
- 68. Such coordination of IRS offenses against Scientology Churches and Scientologists generally also reaches down to the LA District level. Since approximately July 1989, monthly meetings have been held at the Pasadena, California courthouse that houses the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to coordinate the actions of the Los Angeles EO (represented at such meetings by defendant Young), Examinations

poivision, and upon information and belief, LA CID. These monthly meetings are arranged and coordinated by the Los Angeles District Counsel's office, and are attended by a number of District Counsel staff and, in fact, are chaired by defendant Jeglikowski, who supervises the meetings and the matters coordinated therein, against plaintiff and other Scientology Churches in disregard of the Constitution, the Internal Revenue Code, and policies set forth in the Internal Revenue Code. A regular topic of these meetings has been civil lawsuits involving plaintiff and other Scientology churches. The cases specifically include the civil suit filed by the Aznarans, and a case involving a former attorney for the Church. Defendant Jeglikowski has met with an attorney for one of the civil litigants, for purposes of coordinating actions between the IRS and the civil litigants against plaintiff.

- 69. The monthly meetings in Pasadena, like the meetings held from time to time at the National Office, are the vehicles by which defendants have singled out a religion and its churches and parishioners for singular and unfair treatment based upon their religious affiliation and set about to administer the Internal Revenue Code in a manner designed specifically to affect such co-religionists in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and to cause the harm hereinafter averred.
- 70. Plaintiff has made repeated efforts to resolve any legitimate concerns on the part of the IRS. As shown above, the Church has provided voluminous information to the IRS over the years to allay any concerns and to respond to any legitimate questions. These efforts on the part of the Church

have been either been perverted (as in the use of this information for purposes of a CID investigation), or rebuffed. Within the past few months, plaintiff once again attempted to resolve various issues with EP/EO representatives, including defendant Owens. However, the IRS continuously demanded the production of voluminous quantities of documents as a precondition for further talks. Most of the information requested had previously been provided to the IRS over the past years, yet the EP/EO representatives demanded it once again. When informed that the production of documents being requested on a voluntary basis was so extensive as to require months if not years to review, one representative of EP/EO remarked that this did not concern him, as he had twelve years left in the IRS before retirement.

- 71. The defendants, and each of them, by their conduct alleged herein, have singled out plaintiff for invidious discrimination in the application of the laws of the United States on the basis of plaintiff's religious affiliation, in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
- 72. Plaintiff has been damaged and continues to be damaged thereby in an amount to be proven at trial. That amount is not presently capable of precise calculation but is believed to be in excess of \$20,792,850 which represents direct expenditures by plaintiff. Plaintiff has also suffered consequential and resulting damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but which is in an amount in excess of \$100 million.
 - 73. The conduct alleged herein is ongoing and, unless

enjoined by this Court through an order forbidding defendants from any and all further participation in any matter involving the IRS and plaintiff or any other Scientology Churches or any other Scientology entities or parishioners, the harm alleged herein will continue and the Constitutional violations will persist to plaintiff's detriment.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(For Fifth Amendment Violations by All Defendants)

- 74. The Church repeats and realleges each and every averment set forth in paragraphs 1 through 73, inclusive.
- 75. Defendants have, in the course of conduct hereinabove averred, acted in violation of the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the policies, and procedures, and practices of the IRS created by the IRS for the benefit of taxpayers. Such conduct is a denial of plaintiff's due process rights as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
- 76. Plaintiff has been damaged and continues to be damaged thereby in an amount to be proven at trial. That amount is not presently capable of precise calculation but is believed to be in excess of \$20,792,850 which represents direct expenditures by plaintiff. Plaintiff has also suffered consequential and resulting damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but which is in an amount in excess of \$100 million.
- 77. The conduct alleged herein is ongoing and, unless enjoined by this Court through an order forbidding defendants from any and all further participation in any matter involving the IRS and plaintiff or any other Scientology churches or any

other Scientology entities or parishioners, the harm alleged herein will continue and the Constitutional violations will persist to plaintiff's detriment.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff Church of Scientology International prays that:

- 78. Defendants, and each of them, be preliminarily and permanently enjoined from any and all further participation in and responsibility for any matter involving the IRS and plaintiff or any other Scientology Church or entity, or any Scientology parishioner;
- Plaintiff be awarded damages according to proof, which are believed to be in excess of \$20,792,850 in direct expenditures by plaintiff, and consequential and resulting damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but which is in an amount in excess of \$100 million, and
- 80. The Court award and order such other and further relief that it deems appropriate under these circumstances. Dated: August 12, 1991

Respectfully submitted,

QUINN, KULLY AND MORROW

COOLEY, MANION, MOORE & JONES, P.C.

BERRY & CAHALAN

BOWLES & MOXON

WILLIAM T. DRESCHER

Attorneys for Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000, Los Angeles, CA 90028.

On June 14, 1994 I served the foregoing document described as SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS WITH REFERENCE TO SUPPORTING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF CROSS-DEFENDANT CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES THE SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION OF THE AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT on interested parties in this action,

- [] by placing the true copies thereof in sealed envelopes as stated on the attached mailing list;
- [X] by placing [] the original [X] true copies thereof in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

PAUL MORANTZ P.O. Box 511 Pacific Palisades, CA 90272

FORD GREENE HUB Law Offices 711 Sir Francis Drake Blvd. San Anselmo, CA 94960-1949

[X] BY MAIL

- [] *I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.
- [X] As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party

served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit.

Executed on June 14, 1994 at Los Angeles, California.

[]	**(B	Y	PERSO	NAL	SEI	RVICE)	I	del	ivered	such
en	vel	opes	by	hand	to	the	offices	of	the	addres	sees.

Executed on ______, at Los Angeles, California.

- [X] (State) I declare under penalty of the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.
- [] (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

Print or Type Name

Signature

^{* (}By Mail, signature must be of person depositing envelope in mail slot, box or bag)

^{** (}For personal service signature must be that of messenger)